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ABSTRACT
Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for 65 years persist
despite periods of extreme tension and change? I use the Model of Punctuated Equilibrium
from evolutionary biology as a framework to answer this question. The PE Model is
comprised of two parts, positive and negative feedback. A positive feedback mechanism, or
punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting
mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. According to this
model, if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will
increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. To test my
hypothesis, I implement a theory-guided case study. My first case encompasses the positive
feedback cycle formed by the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The second case
discusses the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Strait Confrontation. The goal
of this study is to explore the rise of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of
negative feedback that stabilizes the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated.
为什么在这六十五年来，中国和台湾的关系还在弄僵？ 我用进化生物学的
Model of Punctuated Equilibrium 来回答这个问题。这 PE Model 由两部分做成：正反馈
和负反馈。这反馈是一个换得快的过程。这个过程要经过注意力转移和模仿。 负反馈
是一个自动教程的机制。 这个机制均衡任何外力来创造一个稳定的输出。按照这个模
型，如果中国和台湾增加他们的破坏性等，美国就会增加他的影响力和提高稳定性，
导致减少他们冲突。 为了测试我的假设我实现了一个理论制造的个案研究。 我的第一
个案例包含了台湾第一和第二次台海危机。 我的第二个案例讨论了第三次台海危机和
1999 年台湾海峡对峙。我的研究目的是来了解台海的冲突和重建台湾和中国的关系。
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
There have been long-standing tensions between the People’s Republic of China and
the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Taiwan Strait serves as the symbolic epicenter of
this tumultuous relationship. Discord was heightened across the Taiwan Strait when the
President of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui decided to visit Cornell University for a class reunion in
June of 1995. The U.S. government under Bill Clinton initially refused this request, but the
U.S. Congress passed a resolution to allow President Lee to visit the United States. In
response, the People’s Republic of China conducted a series of threatening military exercises
from August 1995 into March 1996. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also carried out a
set of missile tests less than fifty miles from Taiwan’s major port cities of Keelung and
Kaohsiung.1 The United States countered this challenge with the largest display of U.S.
military force in Asia since the Vietnam War. The situation was resolved only when U.S.
President Clinton formally declared the “three nos” policy: no to Taiwan independence, no to
two Chinas, and no to Taiwan joining international organizations that require statehood for
membership. The fact that a simple visit to the United States appeared to challenge the PRC’s
sovereignty to such a degree that another war in the Pacific looked likely suggests the dire
straits of the Taiwan Strait relationship.
Despite this crisis—in addition to two previous Taiwan Strait Crises (in 1954-55 and
1958) and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation—relations between the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) remain in a deadlock. China has not been
able to conquer Taiwan, and Taiwan still cannot secede from China. These cycles of tension
across the Strait have repeatedly threatened to bring the United States into a war against

1

Andrew Scobell, “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis,”
Political Science Quarterly 115 no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 237.
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China. In light of these crises, will this status quo of deadlock continue? Is Greater Chinese
unification a myth or reality? I argue that this rivalry is likely to endure due to the negative
feedback cycle instituted by the United States. This study analyzes the changing relations
between China, Taiwan, and the United States using the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE
Model) from international relations theory.2 It builds directly on the work of political scientist
Weixing Hu, who examined the cross-Strait relationship using a version of this model. Key
questions that will guide this study include: Why does the deadlock that has defined ChinaTaiwan relations for decades persist despite periods of extreme tension and change? How
have the foreign policy decisions of each state in the system helped to disrupt or maintain the
persistent deadlock? To answer these questions, I will use the PE Model to explore the
positive feedback cycles of the Taiwan Strait Crises and Taiwan Confrontation and the
process by which the negative feedback cycle is reinstituted. A positive feedback mechanism,
or punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting
mechanism, which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones state, equalizes any outside force to
create a stable output.
I hypothesize that: if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the
United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of
conflict in accord with the PE theory. The independent variable of study is the level of
positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. The intervening variable is defined
as the level of negative feedback from the United States. The resultant level of conflict is the

2

Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, “Positive and Negative Feedback in Politics,” in Policy Dynamics,
ed. Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002).
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dependent variable. The operationalization and conceptualization of these variables is
discussed in Chapter Three: Methodology.
To test my hypothesis, I use a theory-guided case study approach to analyze the
complex and changing relationships among the actors (China, Taiwan, and the United
States), and how domestic and foreign policy shifts in each political entity impact the status
quo. Specifically, the case studies will examine the policy actions of the United States,
China, and Taiwan leading up to, during, and in the aftermath of the three Taiwan Strait
Crises and Taiwan Confrontation. I conduct two case studies: the first encompasses the First
and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, and the second examines the Third Crisis and the Taiwan
Confrontation. This study draws on secondary source material of historians and political
scientists in English and Chinese. In addition, I consult primary sources from the National
Security Archive and the Mainland Affairs Council Database. The goal of this study is to
explore the rise of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the resultant level of negative feedback
that deescalates the situation until the political deadlock is reinstated.
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter surveys the history of China-Taiwan relations, as well as the scholarship
regarding the question of Greater Chinese unification: whether integration of the two polities
is likely or if the status quo of deadlock is expected to continue. Next, it reviews literature
regarding the Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model), beginning with the model’s origins
in evolutionary biology, its crossover into social science, and finally its application in the
fields of political science and international relations. The chapter ends with a review of
scholarly applications of the PE Model, in which I evaluate ideas in relation to my own
study.
The PE Model has been applied in multiple ways within the fields of political science
and international relations (IR). To describe common foundations of this approach, this
chapter surveys different analytical perspectives. For example, I review Michael C.
MacLeod’s “The Logic of Positive Feedback: Telecommunications Policy Through the
Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of a Regulated Monopoly.” While not directly
related to international relations, MacLeod’s methodology will inform my own study.
Second, I review Weixing Hu’s “Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations:
A Punctuated Equilibrium Model.” I plan to build on these studies to more strictly apply the
PE Model to specific instances of positive feedback.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The Taiwan Strait, also called the Formosa Strait, is an arm of the Pacific Ocean, 100
miles (160 km) wide at its narrowest point, lying between the coast of China’s Fukien
province and the island of Taiwan (Formosa). The term ‘cross-Strait relations’ refers to the

10
intersecting political, military, economic, cultural, and social relationships between Taiwan
and Mainland China. Given the politically charged nature of the relationship between Taiwan
and China, this phrase is often used to avoid naming either side directly and reproducing a
discourse of Taiwan as either differentiated from or as a part of China. ‘Cross-Strait
relations’ as a phrase acknowledges only the most irrefutable, empirical facts of geography
and the presence of a stretch of ocean between the two coasts. In order to comprehend the
complexities of the cross-Strait relationship, it is important to understand several key actors
involved and their motivations.

Figure 2.1: Map of the Taiwan Strait3

The People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in 1949 and led by the Chinese
Communist Party, claims Taiwan as part of the territory of China. It refers to Taiwan as a
3

“Taiwan Simulates 2017 Invasion by China,” Islam Times, 16 July 2013,
http://islamtimes.org/en/doc/news/283554/ (accessed November 11, 2015).
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rogue province.4 The PRC’s responses to Taiwan’s socio-political development range from
emotional appeals to ‘Taiwan compatriots’5 to belligerent threats and displays of military
power. The PRC has clearly stated its goal of the eventual integration of the two entities.
Steven Goldstein explains, “The present policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
primarily to seek peaceful means to achieve a united China through reunification with
Taiwan under the rubric of ‘one country, two systems.’”6 Beijing will only negotiate on the
precondition that Taiwan recognizes the “one China” principle.
The Republic of China (ROC) was founded on Mainland China in 1912 at the end of
the Qing dynasty.7 At the time, the island of Taiwan, which had been ceded in perpetuity by
the Qing in 1895, was a colony of Japan. Following the Japanese surrender in World War II
in 1945, the ROC, led by the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang, took control of the island. In
1947, following eighteen months of corrupt KMT governance, the native Taiwanese rebelled.
The bitter legacy of the brutal suppression of the February Twenty-eighth Uprising led to the
emergence of the modern Taiwanese independence movement.8 In 1949, the Nationalists
(KMT) lost the Civil War to the Communists and relocated the national government of the
ROC to Taipei on Taiwan. A million or more Nationalist refugees and soldiers arrived to live
among a hostile population of nearly five million Taiwanese.

4

Yueran Zhang, “The Taiwan in My Mind,” Foreign Policy, 12 February 2014,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/12/the-taiwan-in-my-mind/ (accessed November 11, 2015).
5
“China Issues Statement on Taiwan Election,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China:
The Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council, 17 November 2000,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t15789.shtml (accessed November 11, 2015).
6
Steven M. Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock,” Cambridge Review of
International Affairs 15:1 (2002), p. 86.
7
Asian Studies Center, “Asian Studies Presents Windows on Asia: China-History,” Michigan State University,
2014, http://asia.isp.msu.edu/wbwoa/east_asia/china/history/Republican_China.htm (accessed November 11,
2015).
8
Chunjuan Nancy Wei, “Cross Strait Relations Today: Challenges and Opportunities,” in New Dynamics in
East Asian Politics, ed. Zhiqun Zhu (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2012), pp.
85-87.
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This history continues to influence Taiwan’s divisive and often rancorous democratic
politics. National identity is the subject of vigorous debate. Two opposing political coalitions
define Taiwan’s domestic and foreign policy. Political opinion is polarized between the PanBlue Coalition of parties who support unification and a broader Chinese cultural identity, and
the Pan-Green Coalition comprised of those supporting independence, self-determination,
and Taiwanese cultural nationalism. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the largest
Pan-Green party, espouses the “one country on each side” ideology concerning cross-Strait
relations, but in practice supports the status quo so as not to provoke the PRC.9 The KMT, the
largest Pan-Blue party, advocates a “one area” diplomatic truce. They seek to maintain the
status quo with the stated goal of unification.10 The resultant foreign policy of the ROC “has
been to maintain a status quo that perpetuates its declared status as a ‘sovereign independent’
state, while remaining open to a future relationship with the Mainland that might be achieved
through negotiations.”11 Taipei has stated it will only conduct negotiations if not forced to
address the “one China” issue.
Meanwhile, the United States is another player in the complex affairs of China and
Taiwan. The United States seeks to promote stability in the region, because if a conflict were
to break out, there is a high probability of American involvement.12 The United States
encourages dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, but avoids a direct mediating role. Due to the
relations of the United States with both the ROC and the PRC, it must conduct the balancing
act in the region.

9

Wei, “Cross Strait Relations Today,” pp. 85-87.
Ibid., p. 86.
11
Goldstein, “The Taiwan Strait,” p. 86.
12
Ibid., p. 87.
10
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Taiwan and the United States have a long history. The two countries were close allies
during World War II and after the ROC relocated to Taiwan after the Chinese Civil War in
1949, the United States continued to recognize the ROC as the sole government of China.
During the Cold War era and in the aftermath of the Korean War, the United States, as part of
their anti-communist foreign policy, signed the Sino-American Defense Treaty in 1954 to
consolidate their military alliance with the ROC. U.S. policy towards the ROC experienced
major change in 1972, when President Nixon began to normalize U.S. relations with the
PRC. On January 1, 1979, the United States transferred diplomatic recognition from the ROC
to the PRC. This action, however, did not end the long-standing relationship between the
United States and the ROC. On April 10, 1979, President Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA) into law, which to this day remains the cornerstone of the relationship
between the ROC and the United States. This document clearly states that U.S. political,
security, and economic interests are linked to peace and stability in the Western Pacific.13
Since 1949, the United States and the PRC have also had a complex relationship,
evolving from tense standoffs to a complex mix of intensifying diplomacy, growing
international rivalry, and increasingly intertwined economies. In the Chinese Civil War, the
United States backed the Nationalist government of Chiang. This set the stage for several
decades of limited U.S. relations with Mainland China.14 In the spring of 1955, in the midst
of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States threatened a nuclear attack on China. In
April, China agreed to negotiate. However, crisis erupted again in 1956, 1996, and 1999.
The Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969 turned the tide of U.S.-China relations. The
Soviet Union replaced the United States as China’s biggest threat, contributing to the PRC’s
13

Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present),” http://www.cfr.org/china/usrelations-china-1949---present/p17698 (accessed November 12, 2015).
14
Ibid.
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eventual rapprochement with the United States. 1971 began the era of Ping-Pong Diplomacy,
in which China’s ping-pong team invited members of the U.S. team to China. That same
year, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to China.15 Shortly thereafter, the
United States and the UN recognized the PRC as the legitimate government of China,
endowing it with the permanent Security Council seat formerly held by the ROC. In 1972
President Nixon visited China and met with Chairman Mao Zedong. They signed the
Shanghai Communiqué, which set the stage for improved relations by allowing China and the
United States to discuss difficult issues like Taiwan.16 In the wake of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre, the United States suspended military sales to China and froze relations. In 1993,
President Clinton launched a policy of “constructive engagement” with China. President
Clinton signed the U.S-China Relations Act of 2000, granting the PRC permanent normal
trade relations with the United States.17 Tensions and economic interdependence have only
deepened between the United States and the PRC. The hot-cold relationship between the two
states can be attributed to their vastly different value systems and governmental structures.
However, they are so interdependent that their deepening relations are unavoidable.
The Soviet Union and later Russia provide context for the conflicts across the Taiwan
Strait. However, due to the subsidiary role it plays in the three Taiwan Strait crises and
Taiwan confrontation, this actor falls outside the bounds of my study.
China, Taiwan, and the United States each play a part in the balancing act that is
cross-Strait relations, but those roles have changed over time. China has since grown into a

15

Ibid.
“Joint Communique of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Shanghai
Communique),” China Through a Lens, 28 February 1972, http://www.china.org.cn/english/chinaus/26012.htm (accessed November 12, 2015).
17
Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Relations with China (1949-Present).”
16
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regional and global hegemon, Taiwan into a budding democracy, and the United States
serves as their unwilling mediator.

CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS:
PREDICTING UNIFICATION OR DEADLOCK
Within the literature about China-Taiwan relations, many political science scholars
examine the question of Chinese unification as a potential solution to tensions across the
Strait. The unification camp believes that through economic, cultural, and political
integration Taiwan will be pulled into the orbit of the PRC. Conversely, the status quo camp
argues that the prediction of unification is overly optimistic. Scholars argue that the
differences between the two political entities are simply too great to ever overcome the
separation.

UNIFICATION
Scholars define unification as the eventuality that the two political entities of the PRC
on the Mainland and the ROC on Taiwan will merge into a single political entity. This camp
is comprised of researchers who believe that China and Taiwan will overcome the “persistent
deadlock” to unite by means of economic, cultural, and/or political integration.
Several scholars argue that Greater China will be unified through economic
integration despite the vastly different economic systems and political structures on the
Mainland and on Taiwan. These scholars model economic integration after the experience of
the European Union (EU), claiming that “economic integration can ramify and generate

16
spillover effects,” 18 into political and cultural areas. These positive spillovers foster an
increasingly integrated community. Estrada and Park found evidence that the gap in
economic and technological development between the two polities is shrinking.19 Robert F.
Ash and Y. Y. Kueh argue, “The undoubted benefits of closer economic integration within
Greater China are not to be taken for granted…. But many obstacles remain to be overcome
if the growth and structural benefits are to be sustained.”20 Economic integration of these two
polities could be considered a positive feedback cycle, but only if economic ties truly spilled
over into the political arena.
Some scholars contend that unification will occur via cultural integration, that the
commonalities among citizens on the ground will overcome the political impasse across the
Strait. This is the belief that the shared culture of the citizens of China and Taiwan at the
individual level will eventually overcome the overarching forces of ideology and power
alignment. Culture such as religion can be a uniting force across territorial boundaries.
Deborah A. Brown and Tun-jen Cheng explain, “From the Taiwan side, accommodation of
increasing religious exchanges is instrumental to peace with China, and perhaps to inducing
China’s political liberalization. In Beijing, officials use cross-Strait religious ties as a nonthreatening means to draw Taiwan closer to unification.”21 The PRC utilizes pre-existing
commonalities to bring the two political entities into dialogue. This multi-level integration of
religious culture across the Strait combines political science and religious studies scholarship.
One such scholar, Mayfair Mei-hui Yang examines the “complex interactions among the
18

Chien-Min Chao, “Will Economic Integration Between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to Congenial
Political Culture?” Asian Survey 43:2 (2003), p. 281.
19
Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada and Donghyun Park, “China’s Unification: Myth or Reality?” Panoeconomics 4
(2014), p. 465.
20
Robert F. Ash and Y. Y. Kueh, “Economic Integration within Greater China: Trade and Investment Flows
between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan,” The China Quarterly 136 (December 1993), p. 745.
21
Deborah A. Brown and Tun-jen Cheng, “Religious Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Patterns, Alignments,
and Political Effects,” Elsevier Limited on behalf of Foreign Policy Research Institute (Winter 2012), p. 60.
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nation-state, popular religion, media capitalism, and gendered territorialization as these are
inflected across the Taiwan Strait.”22 She points to one specific case of cultural integration
and exchange in passing: “In 2000, [a] pilgrimage by Taiwanese worshippers of the maritime
goddess Mazu to her natal home in Fujian Province was broadcast live from China back to
Taiwan via satellite television.”23 This pilgrimage transcended territorial boundaries and the
high-tension politics of cross-Strait relations. Both the PRC and ROC frame this grassroots
religious movement as a common foundation on which other issues can be resolved and
consensus built.
A small group of scholars argue unification will occur through political means
despite the different political structures that pose a barrier to such an occurrence. Chao
explains, “As Mainland China grows in power, nations and sub-national regions in the
continental vicinity will be sucked [sic] into its orbit and become satellites.”24 Examples, and
perhaps prototypes, of this occurrence are Hong Kong and Macau. These two territories “are
special administrative regions enjoying differing degrees of autonomy and rights.”25 Perhaps
like these two political entities, Taiwan will also be pulled into China’s orbit under the “One
Country, Two Systems” policy.

DEADLOCK
However, another camp of literature refutes the prediction that unification will
happen at all and predicts “persistent deadlock” in cross-Strait relations. These scholars

22

Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, “Goddess across the Taiwan Strait: Matrifocal Ritual Space, Nation-State, and
Satellite Television Footprints,” Public Culture 16:2 (Spring 2004), p. 209.
23
Ibid., p. 210.
24
Chao, “Economic Integration,” p. 281.
25
Jeanette Ka-yee Yuen, “The Myth of Greater China? Hong Kong as a Prototype of Taiwan for Unification,”
Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 5 (July 2014), p. 134.
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define the status quo of cross-Strait relations as the situation in which China cannot conquer
Taiwan and Taiwan cannot secede from China. Steven Goldstein defines the various forms
such a situation might take: When parties agree on the rules of the game, the status quo can
be peaceful. This is the condition that characterizes some of the periods of détente in crossStrait relations. A status quo can be tense and “deadlocked when the parties must accept
unsatisfying compromises because individually preferred outcomes are not possible.”26 The
events precipitating the three Taiwan Strait Crises can be described in this way. A final
condition of open conflict may occur if parties pursue goals in opposition to the interests of
others. President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to his alma mater in the United States is one instance
of conflicting interests escalating to open conflict across the Strait. Scholars have attributed
the nature of the deadlock across the Strait to various different conditions: different political
structures, international pressures, and contending identities.
One set of scholars within this literature argues that cross-Strait relations have
reached an impasse due to the vastly different political structures on Mainland China and
Taiwan. After analyzing the prospects for unification via economic and political integration,
Chien-Min Chao concludes that the political differences between the polities are nearly
insurmountable and unification is unlikely.27 This political difference is also theoretical and
ideological. George T. Crane argues that early on in their relationship the PRC and the ROC
both claimed to be the legitimate government of Greater China: “Contested sovereignty
stands in the way of negotiation and political compromise, both prerequisites for deeper
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integration.” 28 The issue of differing political systems, one democratic and the other
authoritarian, is a major obstacle to Chinese unification.
International pressures also reinforce the status quo of deadlock between China and
Taiwan. The United States is a key participant in cross-Strait relations. While officially
recognizing the PRC as the legitimate government of Greater China since 1972, the United
States continues to make arms deals with Taiwan. The United States has clearly stated that it
supports only a peaceful settlement of the dispute.29 Wang and Liu explain, “The U.S. has
promoted a policy of “double renunciation” in the region, meaning “Taipei would renounce
its intention of seeking Taiwan’s de jure independence, in exchange for Beijing’s consent not
to use force against the island country.”30 Foreign influence in the region on the part of the
United States is an important piece of the framework that keeps the deadlock in place.
Other scholars explain the status quo as the result of contending identities both within
Taiwan and between the ROC and the PRC. The democratization process that began in
Taiwan in 1987 has allowed Taiwanese national identity to flourish and define itself as
separate from the Mainland identity.31 Wang and Liu state: “National identity can be defined
as an individual’s psychological attachment to a political community united by
characteristics that differentiate that community from others.”32 For example, each citizen of
Taiwan is socialized in a democratic system of government, while each citizen of the PRC is
socialized under the new capitalist communism. The co-authors explain that the majority of
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people living on the island of Taiwan favor maintaining the status quo. The political and
social culture of the Mainland and that of Taiwan are vastly different and the gap is only
widening. According to June Teufel Dreyer, “A sense of identity apart from that of Mainland
China has existed on Taiwan for more than a century.”33 Taiwan has been defined by the
cultures of its aboriginal tribes, numerous occurrences of European imperialism, and postWWII American occupation. The cultural divide has deepened even further under the rule
Mao Zedong and the Communist Party. Communism fundamentally changed the culture of
China, while Taiwan’s isolation from the Mainland starting in 1949 fostered a vast
divergence of political identity and culture.34 All of these are contributing factors to the
perpetuation of the status quo of stalemate. Until China democratizes, the prospects look
bleak for unification.
Even now this debate rages on. In February of 2014 China and Taiwan held their first
official talks since the end of China’s civil war in 1949.35 More recently on November 7,
2015, the leaders of China and Taiwan held historic talks in Singapore. According to BBC
News, “Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou shook hands at
the start of the talks, which were seen as largely symbolic.”36 The two leaders did not discuss
any major agreements, or the South China Sea disputes. However, they did discuss the
establishment of a cross-Strait hotline, consolidating the “1992 consensus” agreement.37 Even
as President Ma Ying-jeou pushes for closer ties with China as part of his KMT party
agenda, the backlash from the Taiwanese people is increasing. In light of these
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developments, unificationists are hopeful, while scholars who predict continued deadlock are
skeptical.

THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRUM MODEL
This section discusses the creation of the PE Model, its crossover into social science,
and finally its application in political science and international relations literature. Beginning
with an explanation of Niles Eldredges’ Allopatric Model as the forerunner of the PE Model,
I go on to describe the collaborative and formative work of “Punctuated Equilibrium: An
Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism,” co-authored by Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Next,
I survey social science literature in the fields of anthropology, the evolution of human social
behavior, and psychobiology. Finally, I examine instances of the PE Model in the fields of
public policy and political science.

EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY
The Punctuated Equilibrium Model (PE Model) was originally the brainchild of Niles
Eldredge in his study, “The Allopatric Model and Phylogeny in Paleozoic Invertebrates.” He
describes the appearances and lifetimes of three subspecies of Phacops rana trilobites that
characterize the geological stages of the middle Devonian. Each subspecies had a certain
number of dorsoventral columns of eye lenses, 18, 17 and 16-15, respectively. The number of
eye lenses decreased successively in very quick bursts through Cazenovia, Tioughnioga and
Taghanic stages of rock strata. Eldredge concludes:
“The majority of species preserved in epeiric sediments show no change in
species-specific characters throughout the interval of their stratigraphic
occurrence, and the phyletic model is inapplicable to most of these elements
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of the fossil record. Instead, change in, or development of, species-specific
characters is envisioned as occurring relatively rapidly in peripheral
isolates.”38
This means that changes in the trilobite population happened quickly and were separated by
long periods of stasis. This observation inspired further development of the PE Model.
Eldredge went on to write an article with Stephen Jay Gould entitled “Punctuated
Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism.” Here the co-authors propose that
evolution is not a process of slow transformation, but a process “of homeostatic equilibria,
disturbed only ‘rarely’ (i.e., rather often in the fullness of time) by rapid and episodic events
of speciation.”39 They build on the previous work of the Allopatric Model as developed by
Eldredge, and survey the other arguments in the field. They argue, and urge other scholars to
consider, that evolution occurs in relatively short periods of rare and fast change followed by
long periods of stasis, or equilibrium.
Punctuated equilibrium developed in response to gradualism. Gersick explains,
“Gradualist paradigms imply that systems can ‘accept’ virtually any change, any time, as
long as it is small enough; big changes result from the insensible accumulation of small
ones.”40 In contrast, punctuated equilibrium suggests that for the history of most systems,
there are underlying structures that actively prevent change, rather than the gradualist
explanation where the potential for change always exists, but is suppressed because there
would be no adaptive advantage to changing.
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Eldredge and Gould offer an alternate description of evolution that is supported by
the fossil record. Their research question is why does the fossil record seem not to support
the theory of gradualism? Their answer is that species remain in stasis due to environmental
and internal constraints until the need for change overwhelms the negative feedback
mechanisms.

THE STRUGGLE TOWARD SOCIAL SCIENCE
This section reviews literature of the PE Model that attempts to bridge the conceptual
divide between evolutionary biology and social science. First, I examine the work of Albert
Somit and Steven Peterson, The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model,
a collection of social science scholarship that evaluates the efficacy of the model. Second, I
present the results of three scholars from different social science fields. Then, I present the
conclusions of Connie Gersick who, in her article, “Revolutionary Change Theories: A
Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm,” synthesizes common
definitions of the structural elements of the PE Model across a number of disciplines.
In their anthology The Dynamics of Evolution: The Punctuated Equilibrium Model,
Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson map the evolution of the model from its origins in
evolutionary biology to the social sciences. Somit and Peterson state the two suppositions
that natural scientists can agree upon: “First, that species undergo long periods of little or no
evolutionary change,” and “Second, that these lengthy intervals of stasis (i.e., equilibrium)
are broken (i.e., punctuated) by relatively rapid speciation events.”41 Translated into social
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science these processes mirror negative and positive feedback cycles. Somit and Peterson
struggle to use the PE Model in the fields of social science because they have not entirely
shifted their methodological approach from the evolutionary biology literature.
Within the anthology, Susan Cachel, Allan Mazur, and Brian Gladue all try to answer
the question: “Is human behavior the result of punctuational evolutionary processes?”42 This
question is a step towards the model as defined in political science, but is still solidly rooted
in the discipline of biology. All three conclude for different reasons that the PE Model has
very modest explanatory power for the evolution of human behavior. Cachel in her article,
“The Theory of Punctuated Equilibria and Evolutionary Anthropology,” concludes that the
inherent difficulties of the model as it applies to the biological evolution of human beings
make it unlikely that it will have much impact in anthropology.43 Mazur argues that while
scientists have ample evidence of human physical evolution, they have very little information
about the evolution of early human social behavior; therefore, the PE Model cannot be
applied due to lack of sufficient data.44 Gladue believes that the timespan of human evolution
is so short that “punctuationism” is not applicable to ongoing behavior in the field of
psychobiology.45 The evolution of human behavior is difficult to examine due to the lack of
evidence in the fossil record and the relatively short span of time Homo sapiens have existed.
While these social scientists do not find the PE model very useful to explain the
evolution of human behavior, Albert and Somit try to use E.F. Miller’s concept of metaphor
42
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to explain the leap of the model into social science. E. F. Miller defines metaphor as, “All
types of transference of words and meaning from one kind of thing to another.”46 This
definition is worded in the broadest sense. Metaphor is key to the development of theory in
social science. “Once we see the world from the point of view of a particular metaphor,”
Miller writes, “the face of it is changed. Adopting a new metaphor changes our attitude
toward the facts.” 47 Regarding politics specifically, “Metaphor is necessary to political
knowledge precisely because the meaning of reality of the political world transcends what is
given to observation…. Metaphors can take us beyond the observable and also make
manifest the intelligible structure of the unobservable.”48 The problem of using punctuated
equilibrium as a metaphor is that it loses explanatory power as a predictive model and theory.
This is the wrong bridge to use to cross the model into social science. The history and
evidence of human evolution is not sufficient to draw conclusions using the PE Model, but
when converted into a theory used to examine the evolution of man-made institutions, its
causal mechanisms are left intact, can be translated, and retain their explanatory power.
Another scholar who looks at the transfer of the PE Model into social science is
Connie Gersick. In her article, “Revolutionary Change Theories: A Multilevel Exploration of
the Punctuated Equilibrium Paradigm,” she compares conceptions of the PE Model from six
domains: adult, group, and organizational development, history of science, biological
evolution, and physical science to draw out a general definition. Across these disciplines,
punctuated equilibrium involves “an alternation between long periods when stable
infrastructures permit only incremental adaptations, and brief periods of revolutionary
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upheaval.”49 Gersick describes this theory of evolutionary change as being made up of three
parts: deep structure, periods of equilibrium, and revolutionary periods.
Deep structure is the highly durable underlying order that explains the
interrelationship between periods of equilibrium and periods of change. Gersick writes, “This
deep structure is what persists and limits change during equilibrium periods, and it is what
disassembles, reconfigures, and enforces wholesale transformation during revolutionary
punctuations.” 50 Deep structure in the fields she has combined can be defined as the
environment. Since there is no equivalent to such a structure in the evolution of man-made
policy, I will not include this concept in my study.
Equilibrium periods are characterized by negative feedback loops that actively seek to
maintain the deep structure. Gersick says that when systems make adjustments to preserve
the deep structure, they do so in opposition to internal and external perturbations, and “move
incrementally along paths built into the deep structure.”51 The pursuit of stability in the deep
structure can result in turbulent behavior.
Revolutions are relatively short periods when a deep structure breaks apart. This
period of time is only resolved when a new deep structure forms out of the choices of the
system. Gersick explains, “Revolutionary outcomes, based on interactions of systems’
historical resources with current events, are not predicable; they may or may not leave a
system better off. Revolutions vary in magnitude.”52 The deep structure forms the underlying
negative feedback loop that pulls any deviations back into line. Therefore, this structure must
be disassembled for any fundamental changes to take place.
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Transition periods, are made up of two processes: (1) dismantling the old deep
structure and (2) constructing a new one. There are two basic sources of disruption to the
deep structure. First, internal changes that “pull parts and actions out of alignment with each
other or the environment.”53 This may be the effort of an actor in the system to change its
relationship with another actor. Second, environmental changes can threaten the ability of the
system to access and obtain resources. Gersick notes, “Human systems tend to outgrow the
deep structures that govern their perspectives and activities.”54 The environment in which the
system exists is no longer sufficient to sustain that system. Transition periods in political
science are the moments where the positive feedback cycle overtakes the negative feedback
structure.

POLITICAL SCIENCE
Political scientists Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones converted the ideas presented
in the PE Model from evolutionary biology into a theory of political science. Their 2002
anthology is comprised of works that use the PE Model to explain U.S. domestic policy and
social change. The same arguments and logic that they use to explain domestic policy can be
extended to describe international phenomena.
A complete view of the institutions of the domestic and international systems must
include attention to both positive and negative feedback processes. In their chapter, “Positive
and Negative Feedback in Politics,” Baumgartner and Jones explain, in the context of U.S.
domestic policy, how the PE Model operates in the field of political science. They state, “At
times, government policies seem remarkably resistant to change, following standard
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procedures, working within norms of consensus among all those involved, attracting little
public attention, and deviating little from year to year.”55 The system described here is a
negative feedback mechanism in which actors in a system counter each other to create a
homeostatic device. In contrast to a negative feedback mechanism Baumgartner and Jones
explain, “At other times, or in other areas of public policy, dramatic changes occur: new
problems appear on the political agenda; crises require quick government response; new
programs are created and old ones are terminated.”56 These are all examples of positive
feedback mechanisms whereby rapid, punctuated change occurs. The PE Model combines
the efforts of the many scholars studying different parts of the same process. Institutions are
endogenous to the model, rather than exogenous. The policy process itself alters the way
institutions function. This theory aims to produce a reliable model for longitudinal studies
and is comprised of two parts: an understanding of institutionally induced equilibrium
(negative feedback) and a theory of institutional development (positive feedback).

APPLICATION OF THE PE MODEL
Some scholars use phenomena in the domestic or international systems to build upon
the PE Model. Others use the model to explain a particular policy or subsystem, which either
results in a rapid change due to a positive feedback mechanism, or results in a political
balancing act. These scholars use the PE Model as a framework in which they integrate
additional theoretical models that are more closely related to the subject of study.
Michael
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Regulated Monopoly,” is an example of the PE Model applied to policy change. MacLeod
argues that scholars should be more concerned with positive feedback mechanisms because,
“most policy subsystems have undergone rapid changes at some point in their evolution.”57
He explains that positive feedback takes many forms in social science literature:
“bandwagons, fads, tipping points, vicious and virtuous cycles, conflict expansion, and
punctuated equilibrium.”58 Most studies of these forms of positive feedback focus mainly on
mass behavior. MacLeod develops a two-part theory that examines both mass and elite
behavior within the framework of the PE Model.
The author uses the lens of positive feedback to analyze political campaigns and
collective action movements as well as policymaking. Regarding political campaigns,
MacLeod states three important findings of voting behavior to the study of positive feedback:
“(1) political campaigns have the strongest impact on those who are undecided; (2) in a
situation of low information about one or more candidates, individuals gather information
from others like them (and this is a rational strategy); (3) feelings of political efficacy are
based on expectations of future success.”59 These behavioral patterns create information
cascades. Similarly, collective actions usually involve some type of threshold or tipping point
in addition to information cascades. MacLeod clarifies that a threshold is, “the point at which
a given actor will make a decision based on the proportion of other actors that have already
done so.”60 The main points he gathers from the work of other scholars is that bandwagons
occur under two specific and equally necessary conditions: (1) there exists a large group with
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little or no private information about the choices so they have no strong preferences towards
one choice or the other; and (2) there is some expectation of success for the outcome of a
choice.
These two conditions also apply to positive feedback in policy making with the
addendum that elite decision makers are constrained by norms, rules, and procedures. These
constraints form a negative feedback cycle of stability. MacLeod argues that these
institutions promote short-term equilibriums amid punctuations, involving “the incorporation
of new participants, issue redefinition, a loss of jurisdictional control, and changes in
institutional structures and procedures.”61 For these forms of disruption to develop into
positive feedback cycles in elite decision-making, two conditions must be met: (1) that there
exist a significant number of actors who oppose or are indifferent to the status quo; and (2)
that there is an expectation of success that the status quo could be changed. Due to the
institutional pressures to maintain the status quo, elite decision makers must cross a much
higher threshold than in mass behavior.
MacLeod has three hypotheses based on this function of preferences:62
Probability (decision to challenge status quo) = (actor preference)*
(perception of chances of success) + e
The following is a summation of his three hypotheses: (1) If a significant percentage of
actors come to oppose the status quo, then a positive feedback cycle is more likely to occur;
(2) If expectations of successful challenges to the status quo increase, then a positive
feedback cycle is more likely to occur; and (3) If an institutional challenge to the status quo
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remains unchecked by other related political institutions, then cascades may lead to positive
feedback and the destabilization of a policy area.63
In choosing his data, MacLeod first defines the four historical periods of
telecommunications policy: “(1) competition from 1900 to 1933; (2) a powerful monopoly
from 1934 to 1969; (3) limited competition from 1970 to AT&T breakup in 1984; and (4) full
competition thereafter in long-distance service and telephone equipment manufacturing.”64
Within this history, there are two periods of positive feedback, the first during the creation of
the AT&T monopoly in the 1920s, and the second during the destruction of its monopoly in
the 1980s. He operationalizes actor preferences by “coding outcomes of FCC and federal
district court cases on telecommunications policy that involved allegations of antitrust
violation by AT&T, and by coding the testimony of witnesses from various institutions and
interest groups at congressional hearings.”65 He uses detailed qualitative case studies of
telecommunications policy to double-check the validity of his findings. He operationalizes
expectations of success by coding institutional attention to an issue. He performs a simple
statistical analysis to create a table titled, “Percentage of Witness Statements at
Congressional Hearings Either Supporting AT&T’s Monopoly or Neutral.”66 From this data
MacLeod finds, “At times perceptions of success are just as important as preferences when
accounting for policy outcomes,”67 a seemingly uncontroversial statement, but loaded with
implications. His hypotheses are all supported by the data and are cross-referenced for
validity with historical case study accounts. MacLeod targeted the instances of punctuation
within the narrative of a negative feedback cycle to see how policies change overtime.
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PE MODEL MEETS CROSS STRAIT RELATIONS
One author, Weixing Hu, comprehensively describes the forces that maintain the
status quo in one cohesive framework using the PE Model. He examines relationships at the
domestic, cross-Strait, and international levels. He characterizes the cross-Strait deadlock as
“economic integration cum political impasse.”68 His article examines three causal factors of
the positive and negative feedback cycles that characterize the cross-Strait relationship: issue
cycles, pro-independence leadership in Taiwan, and structural constraints. His research
questions include: “Why have cross-Strait relations cycled like this over the past 60 years?
How can we explain the sources of change and stability in the relationship?”69 Hu defines the
components of the negative feedback cycle as growing economic ties between the two
polities, domestic constraints of democracy in Taiwan, economic development and the
recently peaceful unification strategy of the PRC, and Washington’s interests and leverage
over the PRC and the ROC.
Hu’s explanation of the PE Model begins with Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay
Gould, two paleontologists who challenged the Darwinist theory of gradualism. They state
that there is no evidence for gradualism in the fossil record and that evolutionary change
occurs “in localized, rare, rapid events of branching speciation.”70 Similar to the biological
theory, the PE Model in the social sciences is used for longitudinal studies. He explains that
there are three relevant insights of the PE Model for this case: (1) to explain the cycles of
policy change in Taiwanese domestic politics; (2) to examine the roles of “political
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entrepreneurs,” who can set a new agenda within a stabilizing balance of power structure;
and (3) to discern the mechanism or moments of transition between the periods of stability
and change.71 He couples the PE Model with the path dependence theory to better explain
“the weight of precedents, institutional separation of power, partisan politics, and interest
groups.”72
In his methodology, Hu defines a triangle of actors: China, Taiwan, and the Unites
States. He explains their relationships as a set of three two-level games. Within the large
triangular relationship, “there are two important bilateral games that mutually affect one
another: (1) the cross-Strait interplay that is deeply rooted in domestic politics in Taiwan and
in Mainland China; and (2) U.S.-China relations.”73 In addition to these two, two-level
games, there is the relationship between the Taiwanese government and its citizens and
interest groups. Hu defines six variables: three domestic political processes and three
bilateral relationships. Using three case studies, Hu examines the cycles of tension and
détente: the first, 1949-1979; second, 1979-1999, and finally 1999-present. He chose these
time frames as each contains a “rise and fall of tension over some contentious issue, followed
by a period of détente.”74 He concludes his article by indicating that he expects another
punctuation to the current equilibrium over the issue of reunification.
Weixing Hu provides a comprehensive breakdown of the situation across the Strait;
however, he could have used the PE Model more effectively. Breaking down the causes of
this situation of deadlock between Taiwan and China into separate parts, while sometimes
useful for conceptualization, could be misleading. His conception of the model is rather
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shallow compared to other scholars. Hu focused on three entire periods of both change and
stability using three common causal factors, but viewed the status quo as unchanging.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The status quo of stable tension across the Taiwan Strait, rather than the possibility of
unification, is the dominant prediction in the literature and can best describe the major
developments of cross-Strait relations over time. Of the theories used to examine cross-Strait
relations, the punctuated equilibrium model is the most compelling since it accounts for both
incrementalist and non-incrementalist conceptions of policy change. Originally a descriptive
model developed by Eldredge and Gould in the field of evolutionary biology, Baumgartner
and Jones translate the theory into a causal model of political science. The causal
mechanisms are positive and negative feedback cycles. Depending on topic of study, scholars
must rely on other theories to explain the causal mechanism of these positive and negative
feedback cycles.
My research question is: Why has the cross-Strait deadlock persisted for 65 years?
The causal mechanism for stasis is a negative feedback cycle perpetuated by the United
States to counter the actions of China and Taiwan. Essentially, the balance of power politics
model functions as the negative feedback mechanism. The causal mechanisms for change are
attention shift and mimicking, as described by Baumgartner and Jones. These positive
feedback mechanisms between China and Taiwan cause tensions to escalate beyond what the
negative feedback mechanism can handle.
From the three scholars I reviewed, MacLeod, Cioffi-Revilla, and Hu I will adopt key
insights. I will implement MacLeod’s focus on positive feedback cycles by examining the

35
actions of elite decision makers in both China and Taiwan. My study will build directly on
the work of Weixing Hu. Punctuated equilibrium is a model of evolutionary change. Hu only
focuses on the negative feedback mechanisms created by growing economic ties between
China and Taiwan, domestic constraints of democracy in Taiwan, economic development
and the recent peaceful unification strategy of the PRC, and U.S. interests and leverage over
both polities. I want to build on the instances of positive feedback because the perpetuating
mechanisms for the endurance of this rivalry can be best examined when stretched to their
breaking point. I plan to examine domestic processes as they relate to cross-Strait relations
not only on Taiwan, but also on the Mainland and in the United States. Hu confines his study
by only examining relations between China and Taiwan, China and the United States, and the
Taiwanese government and its constituents. The United States has an important relationship
with Taiwan that merits analysis. Finally, he views the status quo as unchanging, yet the
motivations for the deadlock have changed over time. The interests and identities of the
United States, Taiwan, and China in respect to one another have also evolved. The PRC has
become a relative superpower, Taiwan has recently democratized, and the United States has
become a crucial trading partner with Mainland China. The status quo of political deadlock
has not changed, but the nature of relations across the Strait has changed. Early in the history
of the rivalry, following the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait was in open conflict.
However, to fast-forward, increasing the economic dependence of Taiwan on China has
changed the status quo into one of peaceful détente. Even as the Strait remains politically
deadlocked, the identities and interests of these polities in relation to one another have
changed. These changes are the result of positive feedback.

36
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The goal of this study is to explore the presence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait and
the resultant level of negative feedback that may deescalate the situation until the political
deadlock is reinstated. The research question guiding this study is, “Why has the cross-Strait
deadlock persisted for 65 years?” To answer this question I employ the positive and negative
feedback cycles of the Punctuated Equilibrium (PE) Model. As stated in the previous chapter,
I hypothesize that: if China and Taiwan increase their mutually disruptive actions, then the
United States will increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of
conflict. In this chapter, I describe the hypothesis I will use in my study, operationalize each
of the three variables, discuss my method, and describe the process of selecting my cases.

HYPOTHESIS OF PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM
The primary hypothesis of study for this project is: If the level of positive feedback
generated between China and Taiwan increases, then the level of negative feedback from the
United States will increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict.

Figure 3.1: Primary Hypothesis
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
As noted in figure 3.1, the independent variable for this hypothesis will be the level of
positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan. I will measure this variable in the
two years prior to each crisis (IV2-), during each crisis (IVD), and in the two years after the
official end of each crisis (IV2+). These periods of time are shown in figure 3.2. I will
compare each of these measures to determine how the positive feedback cycle grew and
ended.

Figure 3.2: Timeframes of the Independent Variable

Taiwan
The levels of positive feedback generated by Taiwan can be categorized as diplomatic
and military disruption to the system. For the purpose of this study, I operationalize the level
of this variable as low, medium, or high for both types of disruption.
Diplomatic disruption is categorized as low, medium, and high. For the purpose of
this study I operationalize low diplomatic disruption as Taiwan’s political cooperation with
China or an isolationist policy. Isolation entails little communication and, therefore, little
chance of conflict breaking out due to a diplomatic issue. Cooperation amounts to
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communication in order to foster greater interdependence. Both tactics promote stability
across the Strait. Medium disruption of this type is defined as Taiwan pressuring the United
States for a defense treaty or to publicly state its intent to defend Taiwan. This level of
disruption also includes statements by ROC leaders that China must democratize as a
condition of unification. High-level disruption is operationalized as Taiwan seeking
recognition as a sovereign state from major powers in the international system, Taiwan’s
public condemnation of Chinese actions, and/or threats of force against China.
The disruptive force of Taiwanese military actions is also broken down into low,
medium, and high levels. Low-level military disruption is defined as the stockpiling of
weapons

and

offensive/defensive

systems.

Medium-level

military

disruption

is

operationalized as Taiwan aiming missiles at China and amassing troops. High-level military
disruption is characterized as Taiwan firing missiles at Mainland China and/or moving troops
to strategic positions in order to mount an assault.

China
The levels of positive feedback generated by China can be categorized as diplomatic
and military disruption to the system. For the purpose of this study, the level of this variable
can be operationalized as low, medium, or high for both types of disruption.
First, I will measure China’s diplomatic disruption, which can be defined by levels
low, medium, and high. Low disruption is operationalized as China’s diplomatic isolation
from or cooperation with the United States and/or Taiwan. Isolation amounts to little
communication and therefore little diplomatic conflict, while cooperation entails
communication with the intent to establish stable relations. Both states result in increased
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stability in the region. Medium disruption defined as China pressuring the United States to
condemn Taiwanese actions, the detainment of U.S. soldiers, and insistence on the “one
China” principle as a condition for negotiations. High levels of disruption can be observed
when China threatens to use force against Taiwan, publicly condemns Taiwanese or U.S.
actions, and blocks Taiwan’s entry to international organizations.
Finally, I will measure the disruptive force of China’s military aggression, which can
also be defined at low, medium, and high levels. Low-level disruption is characterized as
preparatory measures such as stockpiling weapons and installing offensive/defense systems
as well as the declaration of a ceasefire. Medium aggression is operationalized as threatening
through action to use force against Taiwan or the United States. For example, if China were
to aim missiles at Taiwan or begin amassing troops, then tensions in the region would
escalate. High levels of disruption occur when China actually fires missiles, mobilizes troops,
seeks nuclear capability, or threatens to use weapons of mass destruction against Taiwan.

INTERVENING VARIABLE
The intervening variable for this hypothesis is the level of negative feedback from the
United States in response to the disruptive actions of China and Taiwan. I will measure this
variable in the two years prior to each crisis (IntV2-), during the crisis (IntVD), and in the
two years following (IntV2+). These time periods are detailed in figure 3.3 below. I will take
measurements during each of these times to see how the forces of negative feedback are
overwhelmed and then reinstated. The intervening variable for this hypothesis is the process
of reestablishing the negative feedback cycle and the status quo. There are low, medium, and
high levels of opposition.
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Figure 3.3: Timeframes for the Intervening Variable

U.S Response to Taiwan
To evaluate the level of U.S. military opposition to Taiwanese disruption I will use
Patrick Regan’s six-point scale: (1) troops deployed against Taiwan/for the PRC, (2) naval
forces against Taiwan/for the PRC, (3) equipment or aid to China, (4) intelligence or advisors
to China, (5) air support to China, and (6) military sanctions against Taiwan.75 If two of the
six can be observed, then there is a low level of opposition. When three of the six exist, there
is a medium level of opposition. A high level of opposition occurs when four or more of the
six points are observed.
U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwanese disruption can be categorized as low,
medium, or high. Low diplomatic opposition is defined as U.S. public condemnation of
Taiwan’s actions, the United States trying to persuade Taiwan to withdraw from the offshore
islands, or American citizens advocating for U.S. recognition of the PRC. Medium
opposition is operationalized as the United States publicly improving relations with Mainland
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China. This level also includes U.S. reluctance to deepen diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Highlevel diplomatic opposition of the United States can be observed in the creation of official
treaties with China, which stipulate U.S. involvement if an armed conflict was to ever break
out.

U.S. Response to China
Military intervention is defined as U.S. actions that support the sovereignty of Taiwan
through military means. To evaluate this variable I will use political scientist Patrick Regan’s
six point nominal scale: (1) troops, (2) naval forces, (3) equipment or aid, (4) intelligence or
advisors, (5) air support, and (6) military sanctions.76 If two of the six points are met, then the
situation can be defined as low opposition. When three of the six are present, the opposition
of the United States is at a medium level. If four or more of the six points are observed, then
a high level of U.S. opposition exists.
U.S. diplomacy can also be broken down into low, medium, and high levels of
opposition to the actions of China. Low opposition is defined as U.S. public condemnation of
China’s actions, or support for Taiwan. Medium opposition is operationalized as the
existence of U.S. informal agreements with Taiwan to protect its security, and therefore its
sovereignty, such as the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This level also includes U.S. threats to
go to war with China in the defense of peace in the region and an unwillingness to negotiate
with China. High-level diplomatic opposition of the United States is the creation of official
treaties with Taiwan, with other states in the region, or of domestic resolutions in the United
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States, which stipulate U.S. involvement if an armed conflict was to ever break out in the
Taiwan Strait.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the resultant level of conflict from two
years after the official end date of each crisis until four years after that date. This variable,
framed in terms of the PE Model, is the transformation of a positive feedback cycle back into
a negative feedback cycle. To establish a baseline of the status quo, as it existed before and
after each conflict, I will apply the same set of measures from four years prior to the official
start date of each crisis until two years prior (DV2-) and to the timespan two years after until
four years after (DV2+) the official cessation of each crisis. Figure 3.4 illustrates these
timespans Using military, diplomatic, and economic measures of conflict, as well as a
measure of third-party involvement, I will establish what the status quo was in the two years
framing the independent and intervening variable measures.

Figure 3.4: Timespans for the Dependent Variable
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The level of military conflict in the region can be operationalized on a four-point
scale of low to high: (1) military conflict is the reduction of defensive capabilities in the
region, (2) the de-escalation of offensive forces or threats to use force, (3) cessation of
military force (truce or ceasefire) or the mobilization of troops and deployment of weapons
systems, and (4) continued armed conflict with casualties. The level of diplomatic conflict
can be defined on a similar scale: (1) cooperation and formal negotiation, (2) Within existing
channels of communication making negotiations difficult, (3) hostility to negotiation with
each other, but open to negotiation with a third party and (4) cessation of communication.
The level of third party involvement (TPI) can also be charted on a four-point scale: (1)
nonintervention policy, implying that the situation is stable or contained enough to leave
alone, (2) brokering peace between China and Taiwan or dissuading Taiwan from inciting
further military conflict, and (3) soft support in the form of defending the position of the
ROC in the UN and other international organizations and/or trade embargoes against the
PRC. This level also includes ambiguous policy, which stipulates unclearly defined
parameters for the defense of Taiwan. This level includes the deepening of relations with one
or the other party through diplomatic or economic means. The final level of third party
involvement is (4) hard support in a threat of foreign troops on the ground or warships and
air support in the Taiwan Strait, and/or withholding/blocking military aid to PRC.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
In order to examine the complexity of cross-Strait relations, I employ a theory-guided
case study and draw insightful conclusions by comparing the mechanisms of negative
feedback and the resultant levels of conflict across cases. With two case studies I can better
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understand the details of both the actors and the events to trace how the political deadlock
between the PRC and the ROC has continued despite intense periods of positive feedback
and change.
The question of why this deadlock across the Taiwan Strait has persisted for 65 years,
lends itself to a case study approach. My goal is to discover the process of how a situation of
virtual stasis has persisted in a complex and changing environment. There also exist
relatively few instances of the positive feedback cycles of crisis I hope to examine because
the situation between the PRC and ROC has only existed since the Chinese Civil War in
1949.
Other methodological approaches would not have the same depth of explanatory
power as a case study approach. Due to the nature of Taiwan’s lack of statehood, too little
data exists in many of the areas I intend to study and measure. Often datasets do not include
Taiwan since it is not a universally recognized sovereign state. While statistical studies are
often reliable, they loose some validity in their inability to focus on detail and nuance. I will
not be conducting a rigorous comparative case study that “vary[s] on the dependent
variable,”77 due to the nature of cross-Strait relations. In these cases I expect the dependent
variable to be held in equilibrium by the negative feedback mechanism of counterbalancing
state actors.
My methodology combines a comparative case study and a theory guided case study.
I will compare the mechanisms of negative feedback across these two cases to see if there are
similarities or differences, but I am at the same time trying to explain the puzzle of this
particular case as a whole. The theory-guided component of this study is that it does not try
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to generalize beyond the data. Levy explains, “Theory-guided case studies…aim to explain
and/or interpret a single historical episode rather that to generalize beyond the data.”78 This
definition points more towards the goal of this study. This method of case study relies
heavily on history and aims to explain it in a focused way. My goal is to explain why the
status quo is maintained despite the changing identities and interests of the actors involved.
This methodology is also known as an interpretive,79 disciplined configurative,80 or caseexplaining case study.81 Harry Eckstein in his article, “Case Study and Theory in Political
Science,” establishes the importance of “crucial case studies in testing theory, undermining
the accepted wisdom in comparative research that the larger the number of cases the better.82
I am using the punctuated equilibrium model in much the same way. If my hypotheses are
falsified, the PE Model may not be the most appropriate theory with which to analyze this set
of cases.

CASE SELECTION
I will examine two instances of positive feedback in the Taiwan Strait: the first
encompasses the crises of 1954-55 and of 1958, and the second covers the 1995-96 crisis and
the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation between China, Taiwan, and the United States. The variables
and their measures defined above will provide a framework to analyze each case. In order to
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examine the causes of this status quo I will perform a focused comparative/theory-guided
comparison of the three Taiwan Strait Crises. These crisis situations are instances of positive
feedback that stretch the negative feedback mechanisms to their breaking point. Within these
periods of extreme tension lie the answers to the question: Why has this deadlock continued
to exist after 65 years?
For Case 1, I will combine the first two crises of 1954-55 and of 1958 because they
are one instance of positive feedback. I will define the dates of crisis for the first case as the
start date of the first crisis and the end date of the second. The First Crisis began on
September 3, 1954 when the Communists on the Mainland began artillery bombardment of
the Island of Quemoy. The official end of The Second Crisis was October 6, 1958 when the
Chinese Minister of National Defense offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the
nationalists and announced that the PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week. For
my independent variable I will examine the level of positive feedback in the two years prior
(IV2-), during (IVD), and in the two years following the conflict (IV2+). I will measure the
intervening variable during the same times. For the dependent variable I will examine the
two years framing the independent and intervening variable measures. See figure 3.5 for a
breakdown of the dates.
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Figure 3.5: Case 1 Timeline

The second case study for this project focuses on the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of
1995-1996 and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. These incidents together form one positive
feedback cycle. The third crisis began on June 9-10, 1995 when ROC President Lee Teng-hui
visited his alma mater, Cornell University in the United States. The official end of the
confrontation was May 29, 2000, when President Chen was elected and expressed a desire to
return to the status quo. For my independent variable, I will examine the level of positive
feedback in the two years prior (IV2-), during (IVD), and in the two years following the
conflict (IV2+). I will measure the intervening variable during the same times. For the
dependent variable I will examine the two years framing the independent and intervening
variable measures. See figure 3.6 for a breakdown of the dates.
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Figure 3.6: Case 2 Timeline

SUMMARY
Why has the deadlock across the Taiwan Strait persisted for 65 years? I argue that the
model of punctuated equilibrium can offer an answer. I hypothesize that if the level of
positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan increases, then the level of negative
feedback from the United States will increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. This
chapter has discussed the operationalization of the independent, intervening, and dependent
variables of study. In order to conduct a comparative/theory guided case study that examines
positive and negative feedback cycles in cross-Strait relations, I selected crisis situations for
my two cases. The next chapter will examine each case from the initial point of disruption,
through the negative feedback mechanisms, until the status quo is reinstituted. In the next
chapter I conduct my first case study.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE 1: TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1950-1962
The first and second Taiwan Strait crises together constituted a time of great tension
in East Asia. For the purpose of this study they represent one positive feedback cycle.
According to the model of punctuated equilibrium, a positive feedback cycle is a selfreinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of attention shift and mimicking.
A negative feedback cycle is a self-correcting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force
to create a stable output. I argue that the acts of aggression between the ROC on Taiwan and
the PRC on the Mainland comprise the positive feedback cycle of self-reinforcing change.
Additionally, the actions of the United States to stabilize the Taiwan Strait can be
characterized as a negative feedback cycle.
As noted in Chapter Three, for this study the independent variable is the positive
feedback cycle generated between China and Taiwan; the intervening variable is the level of
negative feedback from the United States, and the resultant level of conflict is the dependent
variable. The bounds of this case are September 1950 to October 1962. In the first section of
this chapter I will measure the independent and intervening variables by recounting the
history of the two years leading up to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The second section will
discuss the independent and intervening variables during the first crisis, in the time between,
and the second crisis. I will then measure those two variables in the two years following the
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Next, I will measure the dependent variable from two years
after the official end date of the second crisis until four years after that time. To establish a
baseline for the dependent variable I will also examine the time four years prior to the first
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crisis until two years prior to that time. Figure 3.5 in the previous chapter illustrates the
timeframe of study.

INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES
In this section I detail my observations of the independent and intervening variables.
The first sub-section describes the two years prior to the first crisis. The second section
details the two crises and the short span of time in between them. The final section is
comprised of the events that transpired in the two years following the second crisis.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1952 – SEPTEMBER 2, 1954 (IV2- & IntV2-)
During this span of time for the independent variable of the level of positive feedback
generated between China and Taiwan, I observed a medium level of economic disruption and
high levels of diplomatic disruption from both China and Taiwan. However, Taiwan was the
first party to initiate high-level military disruption in the region. The intervening variable of
the level of negative feedback from the United States was skewed in opposition to China and
general support for Taiwan. There was medium-level of economic opposition, low to
medium levels of diplomatic opposition, and high-level military opposition to China during
these two years. See figure 4.2 for a breakdown of the independent and intervening variables
for this period of time.
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Figure 4.1: IV2- and IntV2-

Aftermath of the Chinese Civil War
In the two years preceding the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, tensions between the PRC
on the Mainland and the ROC on Taiwan were high. The Chinese Civil War had just ended
and both the PRC and the ROC claimed to be the legitimate government of Greater China.
The United States was wearily working to keeping the peace between the two opposing
governments. In 1952, the Korean truce talks entered a second year,83 and the Cold War
raged between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Truman Administration and the
Eisenhower Administration both had a vested interest in containing communism and,
therefore, protecting the ROC on Taiwan from falling to the Communists on the Mainland.
This show of support for Taiwan was an example of low diplomatic opposition to China.
From 1950 through 1953, the U.S. Navy, looking for enemy resupply vessels, sent
reconnaissance planes near the twelve-mile territorial limit of China. To obtain more useful
photographs, pilots sometimes strayed over Chinese territory.84 This report demonstrates a
high level of U.S. military opposition to China: naval forces, equipment, intelligence, and air
support were all given to the ROC.
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Effects of McCarthyism in the United States
In 1953 the United States deepened ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan.
When President Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected 1953, he decided to allow Chiang to
attack the Chinese Communists. On February 2, in his State of the Union message,
Eisenhower announced that he would be “issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no
longer be employed to shield Communist China” from possible attack by Nationalist forces,
adding that “we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.”85 In
addition to supplying the ROC with naval forces, equipment and aid, intelligence and
advisors, and air support, the United States issued this military sanction against the PRC.
This statement is also an example of the low-level diplomatic opposition by publicly
condemning China’s actions in Korea.
Despite the stabilizing actions of the United States, ROC leader, Chiang was still
intent on taking the Mainland from the Communists by force and wanted to garner U.S.
support for an invasion of the Mainland. In response to the news that Eisenhower was
withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, on February 12, 1953, Chiang
declared that he believed the Nationalist forces could attack Communist China at any time
without UN sanction or fear of Soviet intervention.86 This indicated a high level of Taiwanese
diplomatic disruption of the system. However, Chiang did not immediately order any military
action.
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The United States was still navigating the aftermath of the Korean War and
continuing their anti-communist policy in 1953. On July 27, 1953, the Korean War armistice
was signed, deescalating much of the tension in the region. 87 Weary of the Chinese
Communists, on September 2, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned that if
China were to renew the Korean conflict or send Communist forces into Indochina, the
United States might declare war against the Mainland.88 This diplomatic action helped to
stabilize the region.
Military tensions only escalated after the United States publicly declared its intention
to defend peace in the region. In August 1954, Chiang moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy and
15,000 to Matsu.89 This movement of troops to mount an assault of the Mainland was a clear
indication of high level Taiwanese military disruption. On August 11, 1954, PRC Premier
Zhou En-lai declared that Taiwan must be liberated, warning that “foreign aggressors” who
intervene would face “grave consequences.”90 This public statement was evidence of a high
level of Chinese diplomatic disruption. Six days following this declaration, the United States
warned China against attacking Taiwan in an attempt to stabilize the Strait.91

Conclusion
Taiwanese military and diplomatic disruptions, as well as Chinese diplomatic
disruption during this period were all observed at high levels. The intervening variable of
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negative feedback from the United States was mostly directed at China. By aiding the ROC
on Taiwan, U.S. military opposition to China was high. At the beginning of this period, U.S.
diplomatic resistance to Chinese actions was low, but then increased to a medium level as
conflict between the two polities increased.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1954 – MAY 1, 1955 (IVD1 &IntVD1)
The independent variable of study, the level of positive feedback generated between
China and Taiwan, was initially very high in this period as illustrated in figure 4.2.
Taiwanese and Chinese military disruptions as well as Chinese diplomatic disruptions were
at high levels. Toward the end of the crisis, these measures can be observed at medium and
low levels. The intervening variable of the level of negative feedback from the United States
was generally high during this period. U.S. military and diplomatic opposition to China were
high, while diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was at first medium then at low levels.

Figure 4.2: IVD1 and IntVD1

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis began with the highly disruptive and aggressive
military acts of the Chinese Communists. On September 3, 1954, the Chinese Communists
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began artillery bombardment of the small Nationalist-held offshore island of Jinmen
(Quemoy) and the Nationalists returned fire.92 Chiang then began to pressure the United
States for a mutual defense treaty, only to discover that supposedly sympathetic leaders in
Washington were unwilling.93 By bombing the offshore islands, PRC Chairman of the CCP
Mao Zedong intended to deter a defense treaty, create friction between Washington and
Taipei, and force the international community to pay attention to the Taiwan issue. 94
However, as a result of the bombing of the Offshore Islands, Dulles had no choice but to sign
the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.95 A second U.S. reaction to the bombardment of the
offshore islands came on September 4, when Dulles ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet back into
the Strait.96 In addition to the military equipment and intelligence the United States supplied
naval forces to Taiwan, indicating a medium level of military opposition to China. This was
not only a measure to censure China, but also to constrain Chiang.
Despite U.S. containment efforts, the crisis deepened. On September 7, 1954, the
Nationalists began large-scale air strikes against the Chinese Mainland.97 The following day,
the United States joined seven other countries in signing a regional defense treaty,
establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).98 This institution was formed
to combat the spread of communism in Asia. On September 12, The U.S. Joint Chiefs of

92

Ibid.
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2009) p. 14.
94
Ibid., p. 14.
95
Gordon Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in
1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?” American Historical Review 98:5 (December 1993), pp. 15001524.
96
Ibid., pp. 1505-1507.
97
WGBH, “Nixon’s China Game: 1950-1954.”
98
U.S. Department of State, “Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954,” Office of the Historian,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato (accessed February 20, 2016).
93

56
Staff recommended the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China.99 In addition to
the military support the United States already gave to the ROC, this additional military
sanction against the PRC showed high-level U.S. military opposition to the Chinese
Communists.
Later in 1954, the PRC not only opposed Taiwan, but also began to target U.S.
operations in the Strait. In November the PLA began a campaign of bombing the Tachen
islands.100 In retaliation for U.S. support for the ROC, China sentenced 13 U.S. Airmen, shot
down over China in the Korean War, to long jail terms on November 11. This prompted
further consideration of nuclear strikes against China.101 In the first days of December 1954,
at the urging of Senator Knowland, the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with
the Nationalist government on Taiwan.102 This treaty pledged American support for Taiwan
against any attack from Mainland China. In response, the ROC made clear that it would not
attack Mainland China without first consulting the United States.103 This measure made clear
to the PRC that the United States would defend the ROC, but also placed a check on the
actions of Chiang. Following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, on December 8,
Zhou En-lai warned that the United States would face “grave consequences” if it did not
withdraw all military forces from Taiwan, adding that Chinese “liberation” of Taiwan was
“entirely in the purview of China’s sovereignty and a purely internal affair of China.”104
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The Formosa Resolution
In 1955 the escalation of Chinese military aggression resulted in the Formosa
Resolution. In January, Chinese Communists attacked Nationalist-held islands in the Taiwan
Strait. In response, the Nationalists bombed Communist shipping along the China coast.105
On January 18, Mainland Chinese forces seized Yijiangshan Island, 210 miles north of
Formosa and, completely wiped out the ROC forces stationed there.106 Six days later on
January 24, Zhou En-lai reiterated his intention to invade Taiwan. 107 In light of these
escalations, the Formosa Resolution passed both houses of U.S. Congress on January 29. The
resolution authorized the president to employ American forces to defend Formosa and the
Pescadores Islands, along with other territories as appropriate, to defend them against armed
attack.108 The ambiguity of this resolution helped cool the heels of both Zhou En-lai and
Chiang. Chinese Communists did not want a war with the United States and Taiwan was not
sure which islands the United States would help defend.
Following the Formosa Resolution, the United States began a campaign opposing
Chinese aggression to try and deescalate the Taiwan Strait using nuclear deterrence. On
February 7, 1955, Nationalist troops began the withdrawal from the Dachen Islands with the
assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. 109 Two days later, the Senate ratified The U.S.Nationalist Chinese Mutual Security Pact, which did not apply to islands along the Chinese
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Mainland.110 In a nationally televised address on March 8, Dulles warned China not to
underestimate U.S. determination to meet aggression in East Asia, adding that the United
States could employ “new and powerful weapons of precision.”111 At a National Security
Council meeting on March 10 Dulles stated that the American people have to be prepared for
possible nuclear strikes against China.112 These statements became increasingly public. On
March 15, Dulles publicly stated that the United States was seriously considering using
atomic weapons in the Quemoy-Matsu area.113 The next day, Eisenhower publicly stated, “Abombs can be used…as you would use a bullet.”114 This talk of nuclear weapons grew so
intense that on March 25, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral stated that the
president was planning “to destroy Red China’s military potential,” predicting war by midApril.115

Gradual De-escalation
Even as they prepared for war against China, the Eisenhower Administration feared
that such a war could lead to war with the Soviet Union. While Eisenhower was prepared for
a war against China, some domestic constituents in the United States advocated for U.S.
recognition of the PRC. In the spring of 1955 Eisenhower sent a mission to persuade Chiang
to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu because they were exposed. The President was
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unsuccessful; Chiang would not withdraw. Subsequently Eisenhower provided the
Nationalists with air-to-air missiles that enabled them to sweep Mao's MIGs from the skies
over the Taiwan Strait, and sent to Quemoy and Matsu 8-inch howitzers capable of firing
nuclear shells.116 In an article in Foreign Affairs published in March, Arthur H. Dean, a U.S.
negotiator in the Korean armistice talks and former law partner of Dulles, advocated for U.S.
recognition of Communist China.117
The Chinese Communists also had no wish to go to war with the United States and
sought to negotiate an end to the crisis. On March 23, 1955, China stated at the Afro-Asian
Conference that it was ready to negotiate on Taiwan.118 Zhou En-lai stated that Communist
China did not want war with the United States and was willing to negotiate with the U.S.
government. The United States responded that it would agree to negotiations if Nationalist
China participated in the discussion as equals.119 This was a large milestone towards the end
of the crisis, which demonstrated that Chinese diplomatic disruption was declining to low
levels. On May 1, 1955, the shelling of Quemoy-Matsu ceased, ending the crisis.120

Conclusion
During this period, the independent variable of positive feedback generated between
the ROC and the PRC generally started at high levels and gradually decreased in intensity.
Chinese military and diplomatic disruptions began at high levels and decreased as the desire
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to go to war with the United States waned. Taiwan demonstrated a high level of military
disruption and a medium level of diplomatic disruption. U.S. military opposition to China
was high and its diplomatic resistance showed both medium and high levels. The United
States opposed the Taiwanese with high levels of military deterrence and low and medium
levels of diplomatic resistance.

MAY 2, 1955 – AUGUST 22, 1958 (IVD2 & IntVD2)
The time between the crises was uncertain for the ROC, the PRC, and the United
States. As seen in figure 4.3, ROC and PRC military disruption during this period reflected
both low and high levels. Taiwan’s diplomatic disruption was at a medium level. China’s
diplomatic disruption can also be observed at low and high levels. The intervening variable,
divided into opposition to Taiwan and Chinese actions was similarly turbulent. U.S.
diplomatic opposition is observed at medium levels for both China and Taiwan. Consistently,
the United States indirectly opposed the Chinese Communists with a high level of military
resistance by aiding ROC military efforts.

Figure 4.3: IVD2 and IntVD2
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Policy in the Aftermath of Crisis
In the time directly following the ceasefire, which ended the second crisis, the PRC
worked to keep their diplomatic disruption at a low level. On August 1, 1955, in an attempt
to improve relations with the United States, China released the 11 captured airmen previously
sentenced to jail terms.121 Zhou En-lai proposed a meeting with Dulles to discuss Taiwan and
other problems the following year.122
Despite the deescalating disruption of the PRC, the United States, due to its anticommunist predilections, was reluctant to negotiate with them. In addition to this reluctance
the United States had a vested interest in maintaining its relationship with the ROC on
Taiwan. On June 12, 1956, Dulles rejected the Chinese offer of discussions because of the
short notice and because 13 captured Americans were still imprisoned in China.123 Even after
the Communist government on the Mainland decided it would not want a war against the
United States, Chiang still had designs to take back the Mainland by force. In the summer of
1956, Chiang initiated a secret “Plan K” for joint navy, marine, and army landings in Fujian
and Guangdong provinces. Scaled back from proposals to attack Shanghai or the Shandong
peninsula, nearer Beijing, this venture, Chang argued to Washington, would recoup losses in
Vietnam and Korea. Washington refused to assist.124 One last illustration of the conciliatory
agenda of the PRC and the distrustful nature of the United States in the period was an
incident involving visas for newsmen. On August 7, 1956, one day after the Chinese
government offered visas to 15 American newsmen who had requested them, the U.S. State
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Department announced that it would continue to bar travel to China as long as it held
American “political hostages.”125
The United States continued its policy of denying travel to and from Mainland China
into 1957. On June 25, 1957, Eleanor Roosevelt revealed that the State Department had
denied her permission to travel to China and interview Chinese leaders.126 Dulles authorized
24 news organizations to send correspondents to China for a seven-month trial period on
August 22, but would not issue reciprocal visas to Chinese newsmen.127 In response, on
August 25, the Chinese People’s Daily denounced the State Department’s plan as
“completely unacceptable to the Chinese people.”128 The PRC had finally had enough of U.S.
policy and on October 15, 1957, signed a secret agreement with the Soviet Union to develop
Chinese nuclear capability.129
At the same time as this secret nuclear deal, several civil and political leaders within
the United States called for improved relations with the PRC. In the October 1957 edition of
Foreign Affairs, Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) called for a new foreign policy
toward China, describing existing U.S. policy as “exaggeratedly military” and “probably too
rigid.”130 On December 12, the United States suspended on-again off-again Geneva talks with
China.131
In 1958 the levels of the independent and intervening variables fluctuated. On
January 1, 1958, Mao launched the Great Leap Forward on the Mainland, aimed at
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accomplishing the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly faster pace
and with greater results. Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies. The
"soft" foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, to which China
had subscribed in the mid-1950s, gave way to a "hard" line in 1958.132 In May of that year,
the Americans for Democratic Action called for negotiations toward diplomatic recognition
of Communist China “as a means of establishing the normal channels of communication
between the two nations.”133 Despite these sympathizers, the Administration continued to
mistrust and oppose the PRC.
In June 1958, the Chinese Communists demanded a resumption of Sino-American
ambassadorial talks,134 even while China’s first atomic reactor began operating.135 In July, the
Chinese Nationalists began to anticipate a Communist move against the Offshore Islands.
Urging the United States to commit itself publicly to the defense of the Offshore Islands, they
also sought modern equipment for their armed forces, including the delivery of American
Sidewinder missiles.136 While the United States refused to issue a public statement indicating
that it would defend Quemoy, it did increase its military assistance to the Government of the
Republic of China (ROC) and began intensive contingency planning for a crisis in the
Taiwan Strait. The basic policy of the American government was that it would help defend
the Offshore Islands only if necessary for the defense of Taiwan. American officials in the
field were authorized to assist the ROC in planning the defense of the islands, and assumed
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that nuclear weapons would be used to counter anything but very light probing by the
Chinese Communists.137 This is evidence of high-level military opposition to the PRC.

Renewed Military Conflict
In July 1958, the first military action came in the form of air clashes over the Taiwan
Strait and the Chinese Mainland.138 On July 22, China announced the start of a campaign to
“liberate” Taiwan and began building up forces opposite the island.139 In early August,
officials in Washington became concerned with the possibility of a crisis, although they did
not expect the Chinese Communists to launch a major military attack. A consensus
developed that a high-level decision should be made as to what the American reaction would
be to an air-sea interdiction against the Offshore Islands. There was also strong pressure for a
diplomatic warning to the Chinese Communists that the United States would not tolerate the
fall of Quemoy.140
The United States and China briefly attempted to improve relations in order to
deescalate the situation. On August 1, 1958, the United States and China began the first
ambassadorial talks aimed at improving Sino-American relations. The talks secured the
release of American POWs and spies in China and Chinese scientists detained in the United
States during the Korean War. The talks, held first in Geneva, and after 1958, in Warsaw,
continued on and off until 1972. They were the only point of direct contact between Beijing
and Washington for 16 years.141 Despite this channel of communication, tensions continued
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to mount. On August 22, the U.S. government decided it would participate in the defense of
the Offshore Islands if they came under attack. This demonstrated the high-level military
opposition of the United States to the PRC. It was agreed that, as an attempt to deter a
Chinese Communist move, a public statement clarifying the American position would be
issued in the form of an exchange of letters between Dulles and Representative Thomas
Morgan.142

Conclusion
The independent variable of study broken into Chinese and Taiwanese disruption
varied during this time. Taiwanese and Chinese military disruption as well as Chinese
diplomatic disruption were observed at both low and high levels during this period. The ROC
was diplomatically disruptive at a medium level. The United States matched this and
diplomatically opposed Taiwan at a medium level. There were high levels of U.S. military
opposition to China and medium levels of diplomatic opposition.

AUGUST 23, 1958 – OCTOBER 6, 1958 (IVD3 & IntVD3)
In the beginning of this period the independent variable—positive feedback generated
between China and Taiwan—began at high levels in both military and diplomatic categories.
Chinese Communist disruption began to taper off once they learned the United States was
willing to use nuclear weapons, while Chiang was more difficult to pacify.
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Figure 4.4: IVD3 and IntVD3

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
The crisis officially began with Chinese military disruption. On August 23, 1958, at
6:30pm Taiwan time, the Chinese Communists resumed a massive artillery bombardment of
Quemoy and Matsu, and threatened invasion.143 The initial fire was directed at a ceremony
welcoming the Chinese Nationalist Defense Minister to Quemoy. Artillery fire remained
heavy during the first two weeks of the crisis and was directed mainly at incoming convoys.
At the same time, a number of air engagements took place in which the Chinese Nationalists
very quickly demonstrated their superiority over the Chinese Communists.144 Chinese patrol
boats blockaded Quemoy and Matsu against Chinese Nationalist resupply efforts. This was
accompanied by an aggressive propaganda assault on the United States, threats against
American naval ships, and a declaration of intent to "liberate" Taiwan. Quemoy, which lies
about 10 kilometers from the Mainland, had been used by the Nationalists to mount raids on
Mainland China.145
The United States in response to this outbreak of violence, had to decide to what
extent they would be involved in the crisis. From August 23-24, 1958, officials in the
Pentagon and the State Department worked on position papers for a meeting to be held at the
White House on the 25th of August. The basic position paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
143
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urged the United States to involve itself in the defense of the Offshore Islands, stating bluntly
that, although initial operations might have to be conventional for political reasons, atomic
strikes against the Chinese Mainland would eventually be necessary if the Chinese
Communists were to be stopped effectively and quickly.146
Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists showed only signs of increasing the conflict.
During the first two weeks of the crisis, Chinese Communist propaganda tended to downplay
the events in the Taiwan Strait. The People’s Daily simply reported what was in fact taking
place. Soviet propaganda followed the same line by denying that a major crisis was
occurring. 147 The Chinese Communists, however, did begin to beam a series of radio
broadcasts at Quemoy, calling upon the garrison to surrender and warning that it was cut off
and isolated.148
Once a decision had been made in Washington, the level of military resistance to the
Chinese Communists was maintained at a high level, with the naval and air support,
intelligence, and equipment and aid sent to the ROC. After deliberation on August 25,
approval was given to the Navy paper authorizing the Commander in Chief of Pacific
Command (CINCPAC) to reinforce American capability and to prepare to escort supply
ships to the Offshore Islands. CINCPAC was also authorized to prepare to assist in the event
of a major assault against Quemoy. Aware of the problems that would arise if the Chinese
Nationalists were to know the full extent of U.S. commitment to the Offshore Islands,
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Washington ordered the Taiwan Defense Commander not to inform the ROC of planned
American moves.149
Towards the end of August, U.S. military actions in the Taiwan Strait and in the Far
East in general were substantially increased in order to publicize U.S. determination to the
Chinese Communists. The Chinese Nationalists, who were reacting favorably to the steps
taken by the United States, continued to press for a public statement that the United States
would regard an attack on Quemoy as an attack on Taiwan. They also asked for a U.S.
convoy to Quemoy and stand-by authority for the Taiwan Defense Commander to participate
in the defense of Quemoy in the event of an all-out Chinese Communist assault.150 On August
28, American officials in the field were reporting that the critical issue was the supplying of
Quemoy, and attention then came to be focused on this problem.151 The following day, a
second meeting at the White House authorized American escorts for ROC convoys to within
three miles of Quemoy. This decision was immediately disclosed to the ROC, and plans were
made for such convoying.152

U.S. Consideration of Nuclear Weapons
In early September, Chinese Communist military action against the Offshore Islands
began to taper off,153 yet the U.S. government began discussing the use of nuclear weapons.
On September 2, 1958, Dulles met with members of the Joint Chiefs and other top officials to
formulate the basic American position on the crisis and to define American policy in the
149
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event of a Chinese Communist invasion of the Offshore Islands. At this meeting it was
debated whether or not Quemoy could be defended without nuclear weapons. Additionally,
they discussed the more general question of the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons for
deterrence. The consensus reached was that the use of nuclear weapons would ultimately be
necessary for the defense of Quemoy, but that the United States should limit itself initially to
use conventional forces.154 The Chinese Communists brought their artillery action to a virtual
ceasefire after this date.155
The United States wanted to make clear to the PRC that they would defend the
Offshore Islands. The Chinese Communists responded with low and medium level
diplomatic measures. On September 3, 1958, the next meeting Dulles called with the Joint
Chiefs and other top officials authorized a formal paper urging the President to agree to an
American defense of the Offshore Islands.156 At the same time it was recognized that it was
important to make unmistakably clear to the Chinese Communists that the United States was
prepared to intervene in order to deter a possible Chinese Communist move. Following this,
Eisenhower met with Dulles at Newport,157 and then the President returned to Washington for
another White House consultation on the crisis. The following day, Chinese Communists laid
claim to all waters within 12 miles of its coasts, including the islands of Jinmen (Quemoy),
Mazu (Matsu) and other Nationalist-held islands in those waters. The same day, Dulles issues
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a statement that the United States “would not hesitate” to use armed force “in insuring the
defense of” Taiwan.158

Gradual Reduction of Disruption
The conflict began to deescalate when Communist China expressed a willingness to
negotiate; however, China also continued to call for the liberation of Taiwan. On September
6, Chinese Communist Premier Zhou En-lai issued a public statement offering to reopen the
Sino-American ambassadorial talks.159 The United States agreed to the talks the same day.160
The Chinese Communist People’s Daily devoted most of its front page to Zhou’s statement
and thereafter began to publicize the developing crisis. Meanwhile, the Mainland Chinese
inaugurated a series of public meetings calling for the liberation of Taiwan.161
Chiang sought to bring the United States into a war against the Chinese Communists
in an effort to take back Greater China by force. The ROC, with U.S. military assistance and
convoy support starting September 7, gradually improved its ability to land supplies on
Quemoy. It also continued to press for greater U.S. involvement in the crisis and for
permission to bomb the Mainland. While ROC officials still affirmed that they would try to
honor their commitment to consult the United States before attacking the Mainland, they
stressed that attacks on the Mainland might be necessary. Apparently the ROC was still
trying to manipulate events so as to draw the United States into a greater military
involvement against the Chinese Communists. U.S. officials in the field, attempting to
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develop an accurate picture of the resupply situation on Quemoy, sought to aid the ROC
resupply effort and to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that the United States would
be involved in the defense of the Offshore Islands. In addition, military officers were
engaged in crash planning for possible large-scale conventional operations in the Taiwan
Strait. This contingency planning produced a bitter reaction among some officials, who felt
that large-scale conventional operations were unrealistic.162
During September, public opposition to American involvement in defense of the
Offshore Islands continued to mount in the United States and abroad. American officials
were aware of this opposition and felt constrained by it. The United States sought to answer
its critics in a series of public statements and to warn Beijing that the United States would be
involved in the defense of Quemoy.163 On September 11, 1958, Eisenhower indicated that
Quemoy would not be permitted to fall. There was considerable uncertainty in Washington
during September as to whether or not the Communist blockade could be broken by
American-escorted convoys.164 After some further negotiations with the Chinese Communists
as well as the Chinese Nationalists, U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam held the first of the
renewed Warsaw talks with Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang on September 15.
During this and subsequent meetings, the United States pressed for a ceasefire in the Taiwan
Strait while the Chinese Communists demanded that the United States withdraw from the
Taiwan area.165 Though no consensus was reached, the crisis subsided over the next few
weeks. In mid September Chinese Communist propaganda appeared to be aimed at
162
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minimizing the consequences of their failure to take Quemoy and, at the same time, at
exacerbating U.S.-ROC relations. 166 Even while tensions were subsiding, the political
deadlock between the PRC and the ROC was settling into place.
The United States and China wanted to end the conflict, while Chiang was still
adamant about recovering the Mainland. On September 25, U.S. officials concluded that the
Chinese Communist blockade could be broken and that there was no need to pursue a
diplomatic course toward a political settlement.167 On September 30, Dulles told the press that
it would be foolhardy to sustain large deployments on the precarious Offshore Islands if a
ceasefire could be negotiated. 168 Dulles compelled Chiang to agree to a communiqué
declaring that Taiwan would rely on political means to recover the Mainland.169 In a radio
broadcast from Beijing on October 6, 1958, Chinese Minister of National Defense Peng
Dehuai offered to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the nationalists and announced that the
PRC would suspend the bombardment for one week, if the United States ceased to escort
ROC convoys.170 This temporary ceasefire officially ended the crisis.

Conclusion
The independent variable of positive feedback between China and Taiwan began at
high levels of military and diplomatic disruption in this period. Chinese disruption
deescalated once they realized that the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons;
Chiang was more difficult to deter. The United States maintained a high level of military
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opposition to Chinese disruption through their aid to the ROC and medium and high levels of
diplomatic opposition.

OCTOBER 7, 1958-OCTOBER 7, 1960 (IVD2+ & InvtVD2+)
In the two years following the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s, there was initially
some on-and-off conflict coming out of the ceasefire, but then tensions diminished. The
Chinese Communists suspended their fire for a final time and the Soviets annulled their
promise to help the PRC build a nuclear arsenal. The United States exhibited low and
medium levels of diplomatic opposition to the ROC and low levels of diplomatic opposition
to the PRC.

Figure 4.5: IV2+ and IntV2+

Slow Process of Reinstituting a Political Truce
In the two years following the second crisis there was a brief period of military
conflict in the Taiwan Strait. On October 13, 1958, the Chinese Communists announced that
they were continuing the ceasefire for another two weeks. 171 The Chinese Communists
announced that they were resuming fire on October 20, because an American ship had
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intruded into Chinese Communist territorial waters. 172 On October 25, the Chinese
Communists said that they were again suspending their fire. This time they declared that they
would not fire on even-numbered days against airfields, beaches, and wharves if there were
no American escort.173 Following this latest ceasefire, Chinese Communist propaganda took
the line that they had never been interested in capturing only the Offshore Islands but were
determined instead to capture both Taiwan and the Offshore Islands at the same time.174
In 1959, the crisis situation cooled off. On June 20, 1959, the Soviet Union annulled
its secret October 1957 promise to help China develop a nuclear arsenal.175 On December 7,
the Rockefeller Report on future U.S. foreign policy needs called for improved relations with
the Chinese people, while acknowledging China’s hostile stance towards the United States.176
Public opinion in the United States in 1960 continued to advocate for U.S. recognition of the
PRC. On May 23, 1960, the “Liberal Project,” a group of House members, scholars and
scientists, released a study advocating opening direct communications with Beijing and
withdrawing U.S. opposition to U.N. membership for the PRC.177 There was some backlash
from interest groups who were still staunchly anti-communist. The Committee of One
Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations called on the
American public to support its campaign opposing concessions to the Beijing government on
June 16, 1960.178 The Eisenhower Administration was still a firm supporter of the ROC on
Taiwan. In a visit to Taiwan on June 18, Eisenhower told a rally, “The United States does not
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recognize the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in Beijing to speak for
all the Chinese people. In the United Nations we support the Republic of China, a founding
member, as the only rightful representative of China in that organization.”179

Conclusion
In the two years following the Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s, after minimal
conflict coming out of the ceasefire, tensions diminished. The Soviets annulled their promise
to help the PRC build a nuclear arsenal. The United States exhibited low and medium levels
of diplomatic opposition to the ROC and low levels of diplomatic opposition to the PRC.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable of study is the level of conflict. This section discusses the
dependent variable in the two years following the independent and intervening variables.
Additionally, this section examines the two years prior to the independent and intervening
variables.

OCTOBER 8, 1960-OCTOBER 8, 1962 (DV2+)
In the period DV2+, diplomatic conflict can be observed at level two: China and
Taiwan were open to third-party mediation but closed to negotiating with one another. Third
party involvement (TPI) can be observed at levels two, three, and four.
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During this period, both the United States and the PRC showed a desire to negotiate,
while Chiang remained militant. On March 17, 1961, Sino-American ambassadorial talks
between the United States and the PRC resumed in Warsaw.180 In the spring of that year,
Chiang’s military chief sought to fire nuclear tipped artillery shells from Jinmen. The U.S.
refusal to supply the shells shut this plan down.181
While the United States would not support the military designs of the ROC on
Taiwan, it continued to defend their position as the representative of China in the United
Nations. In August 1961, President Kennedy secretly promised Chiang that the United States
would veto any UN decision to seat the Beijing government, and agreed to cooperate with
Chiang’s forces in covert operations against the Mainland.182 On December 1, 1961, there
was debate in the UN General Assembly on whether to admit the PRC. This was the first
time since 1950 that the question of China’s admission made it to the General Assembly.183
However, on December 15, the UN General Assembly rejected this proposal.184
In 1962 the Sino-Indian War broke out, leaving the PRC few resources to deal with
Taiwan. The U.S. Air Force in Taiwan established the Taipei Air Station. On June 27, 1962,
President Kennedy stated in a press conference:
One possibility is that there might be aggressive action against the offshore
islands of Matsu and Quemoy. In that event, the policy of this country will be
that established seven years ago under the Formosa Resolution. The United
States will take the action necessary to assure the defense of Formosa and the
Pescadores. In the last crisis in the Taiwan area in 1958, President Eisenhower
made it clear that the United States would not remain inactive in the face of
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any aggressive action against the offshore islands, which might threaten
Formosa.185
He went on to state that he was opposed to using force in the region, but would do so in order
to protect Taiwan.

SEPTEMBER 3, 1950-SEPTEMBER 2, 1952 (DV2-)
During the period prior to the independent and intervening variables, third party
involvement quickly escalated from low to high on a four-point scale. Diplomatic conflict
was observed at a level three and military conflict at a level four.
In 1950, the U.S. government considered the conflict between the ROC and the PRC
to be self-contained. The United States would not aid the ROC in any other way than
ensuring they retained their seat in the UN General Assembly, but only to ensure that the
Chinese Communists were barred from entry. As a result of their disillusionment with the
ROC due to its corruptions and inefficiencies, the Truman Administration issued a statement
on January 5, 1950 that they would not intervene for the defense of Taiwan.186 On the 19th of
September, the PRC was barred once again from taking China’s seat in the UN General
Assembly.187
As the war in Korea was breaking out, military conflict in the region escalated. On
the 30th of September 1950, Zhou En-lai warned that China would not stand idly by if “the
imperialists wantonly [invaded] the territory of North Korea.”188 South Korean troops crossed
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the 38th parallel into North Korea on October 1.189 The next day, Zhou En-lai formally
notified the Indian ambassador to China that if the United States entered North Korea, China
would intervene.190 In response, U.S. troops, led by General Douglas MacArthur, cross the
38th parallel into North Korea.191 In November, Chinese troops attacked U.S. forces on both
Western and Eastern fronts. The U.S. forces withdrew.192 On November 26, as UN troops, led
by General MacArthur, approached Korea’s northern border, Chinese troops entered the war
in force, driving MacArthur south of the 38th parallel.193 On December 8, the U.S. Commerce
Department announced a total trade embargo on China. It would remain in place for 21
years.194
By 1951, the United States military was fully invested in the region and in the
struggle against Communist China. On February 1, 1950, at the urging of the United States,
the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution branding China an aggressor in the Korea
conflict.195 On April 11, President Truman dismissed General MacArthur from all commands
in East Asia after repeatedly ignoring White House orders not to publicly demand that the
war be expanded against Communist China. 196 Shortly after that, the U.S. Defense
Department announced the appointment of a Military Assistance Advisory Group for
Taiwan, on whose recommendation the United States resumed direct military aid to the
Nationalists.197
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The U.S. government used the Nationalists on Taiwan as a tool against Communist
China. On May 18, 1951, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk set
the tone for U.S.-China policy for the next two decades when he stated, “The regime in
Peiping [Beijing]…is not the government of China… We recognize the national government
of the Republic of China, [which will]…continue to receive important aid and assistance
from the United States.”198 The UN unanimously adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling
for “every state” in the world to withhold arms or strategic materials from Communist
China.199 On the 10th of July 1951, truce talks began between a U.S.-led delegation and North
Korean-Chinese Communist representatives.200 Korean truce talks entered their second year
in 1952.201

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I measured the independent and intervening variables in terms of the
levels of military and diplomatic disruption in a total of five time periods. I expect overall
trend of the level of disruption to form a bimodal curve. Tensions escalated in the two years
prior to the first crisis, reached a peak during the first crisis, subsided by a small degree, then
increased again during the second crisis. In the two years following the second crisis,
tensions deescalated once more. This sequence of events points to a positive feedback cycle.
The actions of the United States to quell the conflict across the Taiwan Strait formed the
negative feedback cycle that eventually reinstated stability. The next chapter will cover Case
2: The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
CASE 2 THE TAIWAN STRAIT 1991-2004
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Taiwan Confrontation together constituted one
positive feedback cycle for the purpose of this study. According to the model of punctuated
equilibrium, a positive feedback cycle is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change
occurs as a result of attention shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle is a selfcorrecting mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. I argue
that the acts of aggression between the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the Mainland
comprise the positive feedback cycle of self-reinforcing change. Additionally, the actions of
the United States to stabilize the Taiwan Strait can be characterized as a negative feedback
cycle.
As noted in Chapter Three, the independent variable of this study is the positive
feedback cycle generated between China and Taiwan; the intervening variable is the level of
negative feedback from the United States, and the resultant level of conflict is the dependent
variable. The bounds of this case are June 1991 to May 2002. In the first section of this
chapter I will measure the independent and intervening variables by recounting the history of
the two years leading up to the Third Taiwan Trait Crisis. The second section will discuss the
independent and intervening variables during the first crisis, in the time between, and the
second crisis. I will then measure those two variables in the two years following the Taiwan
Confrontation. Next, I will measure the dependent variable from two years after the official
end date of the confrontation until four years after that time. To establish a baseline for the
dependent variable I will also examine the time four years prior to the third crisis until two
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years prior to that time. Figure 3.6 in Chapter Three: Methodology illustrates the timeframe
of study.
Due to the complexity of organizations and historical figures in this chapter, I briefly
summarize here the relevant actors. Several significant events have transpired in the period of
détente between the second and third Taiwan Strait crises. Taiwan lost its seat in the UN to
the PRC in 1971.202 In the 1979 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique, the United States recognized
the PRC as the legitimate government of Greater China and acknowledged that Taiwan was
part of China.203 Even as the United States cultivated its relationship with China, the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act “provides the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the
United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in
maintaining its defensive capability.”204 The United States, seeking to promote democracy
around the world, continued to aid Taiwan with arms deals205 and foreign direct investment.206
Taiwan democratized in the early 1990s and the process was complete with the election of
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian in 2000, ending the
Kuomintang’s (KMT) monopoly on power.207
Relations between China and Taiwan began to improve in the late 1980s and early
1990s when both polities expressed interest in deepening economic and diplomatic relations.
On the 21st of November 1990, the ROC created the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) as a
semi-official organization to handle technical and business matters with the PRC. Though
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technically a private organization, it is funded through the government and controlled by the
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) of the Executive Yuan (the executive branch of the ROC
central government). Following suit, the PRC created the Association for Relations Across
the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on the 16th of December 1991 for the same purpose as the SEF.
This context situates the events of the next section into an overarching history.

INDEPENDENT AND INTERVENING VARIABLES
In this section, I discuss the independent and intervening variables concurrently. The
independent variable is the level of positive feedback generated between China and Taiwan,
while the intervening variable is the level of negative feedback from the United States. This
chronology of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis is divided into three sections for the
independent and intervening variables: in the two years prior, during, and in the two years
following the crisis.

JUNE 9, 1993 – JUNE 8, 1995 (IV2- & IntV2-)
In the period of time between June 9, 1993 and June 8, 1995, diplomatic relations
between China and Taiwan grew increasingly complicated. While both the ROC and PRC
publicly supported negotiation and deeper relations, each wanted unification to be carried out
on its own terms. The differences in the demands of each political entity caused tensions to
rise and the United States to seek greater involvement.
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Figure 5.1: IV2- and IntV2-

Early Attempts at Cooperation
In late June 1993, the ROC and PRC governments entered negotiations to discuss
technical and business related issues across the Taiwan Strait. On June 24, 1993, Jiang Zemin
took over as the director of PRC Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group.208 The Taiwan Affairs
Office (TAO) published a White Paper, “the Taiwan Problem and the Unification of
China,”209 on August 31, 1993. This paper reiterated both the opposition of the PRC to the
entry of Taiwan into the UN, and the support of the PRC for peaceful reunification under the
“one country, two systems” framework. This document demonstrated a high level of Chinese
diplomatic disruption by implying the subordinate status of the ROC to the PRC. Despite this
view and in ignorance of ROC conditions for unification, on December 18, 1993, officials of
ARATS came to Taiwan for negotiations for the first time.210
In early 1994, the political organs on Taiwan and the Mainland demonstrated their
willingness to cooperate with one another on a variety of issues. On January 7, 1994, MAC
announced the “Guiding Principle on cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges at the Current Stage,”
stressing the need to promote cross-Strait cultural exchanges, for mutual benefit and the
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cultural development of the two sides.211 The first Chiao-Tang talks were held In Beijing on
February 2, between officials at the vice-chairman level of the SEF and the ARATS. The
meeting ended on February 5, and the two men issued "the joint press release by Mr. Chiao
Jen-ho and Tang Shubei."212 Even as both sides were seeking to foster interdependence, the
process was not without snags. At the fourth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang
Talks held in Beijing on March 25, the two sides discussed three issues but failed to make
any breakthrough.213

The Qiandao Incident and Its Effects
PRC attempts at diplomatic cooperation fell on deaf ears after the Qiandao incident.
On March 31, 1994, twenty-four Taiwanese tourists were kidnapped and murdered in the
Qiandao Lake scenic area, in Zhejiang, PRC. Insensitive treatment by the local government
and police force following the event, including censoring information and unprofessional
criminal investigating procedures, led to public backlash in Taiwan against the PRC
government.214 On April 9, ROC President Lee Teng-hui publicly criticized the Communist
Party of China as acting “like bandits,” and claimed that the case was robbery committed by
Chinese People's Liberation Army soldiers, as had been claimed by Taiwanese intelligence.
This spurred an increase in public support for independence.215 On April 30, Lee spoke of
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“the sorrow of the Taiwanese” for being deserted by the international community and
without any international status.216
In light of these events the United States tried not to exacerbate tensions in the region.
The United States did not afford Lee typical diplomatic courtesy when he was refueling his
jet in Hawaii on May 3, 1994. According to The Los Angeles Times, “Lee was limited by the
Clinton Administration to only a short refueling stop in order not to offend the People's
Republic of China.”217 Later in the month of May, MAC made public the "Position Paper on
Direct Transportation between the Two Sides," noting that direct transportation would be
launched only when the dignity, order, and safety are ensured for the two sides.218 In a move
that indirectly opposed the actions of Taiwan, on May 31, 1994, the United States decided to
de-couple the issues of China’s human rights record and the Most Favored Nations
treatment.219
Pro-independence sentiment continued to increase on Taiwan. In June, the World
United Formosans for Independence passed a draft constitution of the Republic of Taiwan,
chose a new national flag, and composed a new national anthem.220 Official diplomacy, while
on the surface in the spirit of cooperation, was in reality a demonstration of the nearinsurmountable differences between Taiwan and the Mainland. On July 25, MAC published
the white paper, “Relations Across the Taiwan Straits” 221 in eight languages. 222 This
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document stated, “The fundamental reason why China [could not] be unified [was] not, as
Peking would have it, that a section of the Taiwan population [wished] to separate itself from
China, neither [was] it due to the interference of certain foreign forces.” 223 Instead, it was due
to the political and early economic disasters of the CCP regime.224 The ROC rejected the “one
country, two systems” doctrine, preferring one country, two political entities.225

Continued Diplomacy
This policy difference did not stop the negotiation between the ARATS and the SEF
that was already in motion. On July 30, 1994, the fifth functional meeting after the first KooWang Talks was held in Taipei.226 The second Chiao-Tang Talks ran from August 4 to 7 in
Taipei, where the SEF and the ARATS vice chairmen discussed the repatriation of criminals,
illegal entrants, and hijackers; as well as the settlement of fishery disputes.227
Even while the talks between the ARATS and the SEF continued, domestic policy
and decision-makers in the ROC veered towards escalating conflict. Because the Mainland
military had staged exercises on Dongshan Island in Fujian Province, and Beijing used a
zero-sum attitude to isolate and oppress the ROC’s bid to accede to the United Nations and
participation in the Asian Games, on September 23, 1994, Premier Lien Chan said the cross-
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Strait relations could not advance into the middle-stage under the “Guidelines for National
Unification.”228
Due in part to these increasing tensions, on September 27, 1994, Winston Lord,
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs announced “The Taiwan Policy
Review” of the United States. 229 In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee he stated that the United States neither wanted to “interfere in nor mediate” the
unification process of China and Taiwan, but would “welcome any evolution in relations
between Taipei and Beijing that [was] mutually agreed upon and peacefully reached.”230 Lord
went on to say that despite China’s transition to a market economy, it still adhered “to a
repressive political system.”231 After this policy review the United States continued to provide
material and training to Taiwan to promote its self-defense capability, as mandated by the
Taiwan Relations Act. Arms sales remained consistent with both the Taiwan Relations Act
and the 1982 U.S.-PRC communiqué. In closing, Lord stated that the administration strongly
opposed Congressional attempts to legislate visits by top leaders of the ROC to the United
States, for fear that it would destabilize relations with the PRC.
The United States was pressured to increase its involvement in the Taiwan Strait
when USS Kitty Hawk and China’s submarine and jet fighters had a brief military encounter
in the Yellow Sea.232 China served notice through a U.S. military official in Beijing that the

228

“Chronology: 1994,” MAC.
Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
230
Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Taiwan Policy Review,” statement
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 27 September 1994,
http://www.ait.org.tw/en/19940927-taiwan-policy-review-by-winston-lord.html (accessed February 20, 2016).
231
Ibid.
232
Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, p. xiii.
229

88
next time such a situation arose, China's orders would be to shoot to kill.233 Regardless of
these events, in late December, the sixth functional meeting after the first Koo-Wang Talks
was held in Nanjing from December 22 to 27. However, no agreement was reached.234
In early 1995 this breach between the SEF-ARATS negotiations and relations
between decision-makers in the PRC and ROC governments continued to widen. On January
1, 1995, Jiang Zemin announced his Eight-Point Taiwan policy.235 First, Jiang opposed
Taiwanese independence and would “not promise not to use force. If used, force [would] not
be directed against our compatriots in Taiwan, but against the foreign forces who
[intervened] in China's reunification and [went] in for the independence of Taiwan.”236 Jiang
then announced the PRC’s desire to promote economic interdependence and to accept
invitations to visit Taiwan. In response on April 8, President Lee responded with his own Six
Points.237 “Two of his points paralleled Jiang’s: increasing bilateral exchanges based on
Chinese culture (Lee’s Point 2) and enhancing economic relations.”238 Lee not so subtly
called the Mainland an “economic hinterland.”239 He called for unification based on the
reality that the two sides were governed by two governments, neither subordinate to the other
(Lee’s Point 1). Lee then suggested in Point 4 that both sides could meet in a natural manner
on international occasions. This last, was directly contrary to Jiang’s eighth point, which
repudiated third-party involvement in Chinese domestic affairs.
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The Tipping Point
This stalemate grew increasingly fragile when on May 22, 1955, the U.S. Congress
agreed to issue ROC President Lee a visa for a visit to his alma mater, Cornell University.240
Too early to formulate a response to this U.S. action, the ARATS and the SEF met as normal
and began to make progress. On May 27, the ARATS’ Tang Shubei came to Taiwan for
talks.241 The first preparatory consultation for the Second Round of the Koo-Wang Talks
reached eight items of consensus, and decided to hold the second round of preparatory
consultation talks in June in preparation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks in
Beijing.242
Despite this line of diplomacy the actions of President Lee derailed further
negotiations between the ARATS and the SEF. ROC President Lee visited his alma mater,
Cornell University on June 9, 1995 provoking the PRC.243 On June 15, ROC Premier Lien
Chan embarked on visits to Austria, the Czech Republic, and Hungary244 where he had
private meetings with his Czech counterpart and with President Vaclav Havel. 245 This
provoked strong protest from China. On June 16, 1995, the ARATS decided in a letter to
postpone the second Koo-Wang talks due to a “series of actions taken by Taiwan.”246 The
following day, MAC announced its hope to continue regularized consultation across the
240
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Strait, and to hold the preparatory consultation for the Second Round of Koo-Wang Talks as
planned.247 This hope would be in vain.
On June 22, 1995, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, representing the State
Council, declared Seven Points on Hong Kong-Taiwan relations.248 In this declaration he
made clear to Hong Kong and Taiwan that the central government in Beijing was in control
of Hong Kong’s relations with Taiwan. The handling of Hong Kong’s relation with Taiwan
after 1997 was not part of the autonomous rule of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR); rather, it had to comply with the decision and arrangements made by the
Beijing government.249 On June 30, the ARATS telephoned the SEF its decision to postpone
the regularized cross-Strait consultation.250
Conclusion
In this section, Chinese and Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was either low due to
the cooperation of the ARATS and the SEF or high due to the expression of ideological
divides by politicians higher up each government’s hierarchy. Taiwanese domestic disruption
grew to medium levels due to increased public support for independence. Chinese military
disruption was measured at a medium level due to PLA military exercises carried out
opposite the Island of Taiwan. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was observed at a
medium level, while U.S. opposition to China grew from a low to high level.
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JULY 21, 1995 – MARCH 23, 1996 (IVD1 & IntVD1)
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred in the period between June 9, 1995 and
March 23, 1996. Diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan ground to a halt. While the
ROC publicly supported negotiation and deeper relations, the actions of ROC President Lee
Teng-hui incensed the PRC. The contradictory diplomatic demands of the PRC and ROC
caused tensions to rise and the United States to seek greater involvement.

Figure 5.2: IVD1 and IntVD1

The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
Beginning July 21, 1995 the PRC fired missiles in waters near Taiwan. This
bombardment lasted for five more days.251 In an attempt to pacify the PRC, President Clinton
sent PRC President Jiang Zemin a private letter on August 1, promising “no support for
Taiwan independence.”252 Despite this assurance, or perhaps due to it, the PRC launched
missiles from August 15 to 25.253 Further provoking the PRC, Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian
on September 23, said the two sides would move to “one country on each side” after the
popular direct presidential election.254
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The ROC government remained divided on the issue of independence. On January 24,
1996, ROC Premier Lien Chan reiterated that the ROC government did not wish to see crossStrait relations strained at issuing statements and creating publicity. He wanted the two sides
to open lines of communication and negotiate.255 On January 30, PRC Premier Li Peng made
a statement that only when Taiwan authorities abandoned creating "two Chinas," or "one
China, one Taiwan" both in rhetoric and in practice could cross-Strait relations normalize.256
In March 1996, President Bill Clinton reacted to Chinese missiles plunging into
waters just off Taiwan’s coast by dispatching two aircraft-carrier battle groups to the scene.
This action demonstrated a high level of military opposition to China. Before that,
government officials, members of congress, and the media had not been paying much
attention to Taiwan.257 On March 5, the PRC made a statement in the early morning that it
would launch a military exercise during March 8 through 15, firing ground-to-ground guided
missiles into waters 20 to 40 nautical miles due east of Keelung, and 30 to 50 nautical miles
due west of Kaohsiung.258 Lasting from March 8 through 23, Beijing launched the third round
of missile tests and military exercises on the eve of the ROC presidential election.259 The
Pentagon confirmed that USS Independence and USS Nimitz had arrived at the Taiwan Strait
on March 11.260
These military threats from the PRC continued through the end of March. Starting on
March 12, the PRC staged live-fire exercises in a sea and air maneuver off the coastal areas
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stretching from Xiamen, Fujian Province, to Shantou, Guangdong Province. 261 In the
following days, the PRC fired more missiles in waters near Kaohsiung harbor,262 dispatched a
joint force maneuver in the sea near Pingtan, Fujian Province,263 staged a landing exercise on
a small islet,264 and practiced an air strike exercise.265 Despite all of this intimidation from the
PRC, on March 23, the citizens of the ROC popularly and directly elected Lee Teng-hui for
president and Lien Chan for vice president.266

Conclusion
In summary, Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was either low due to the SEF’s desire
to cooperate, or high due to the rhetoric of President Lee Teng-hui. Chinese diplomatic
disruption was mostly high, because of both threats to use force and an unwillingness to
negotiate due to Taiwan’s course of action. Taiwanese domestic disruption grew to high
levels when President Lee won reelection. Chinese military disruption was measured at
medium and high levels due to military maneuvers and missile tests being carried out near
Taiwan’s coast. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan can be observed at a medium level,
while U.S. opposition to China was measured as high.

MARCH 24, 1996 – JULY 8, 1999 (IVD2 & IntVD2)
In the period of time between March 24, 1996 and July 8, 1999, diplomatic relations
between China and Taiwan continued their complicated trajectory. While the SEF and the
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ARATS supported negotiation and deeper relations, the executive branches of each
government wanted unification to be carried out on its own terms. The differences in the
demands of each political entity caused tensions to rise and the United States to increase their
diplomatic relations with China and continue arms sales to Taiwan.

Figure 5.3: IVD2 and IntVD2

Questions Over the Use of Force
In the wake of the March 23rd elections on Taiwan, the PRC generated a high level of
diplomatic disruption. On April 23, 1996, Vice Chairman of the PRC Central Military
Commission reiterated that Taiwan was “an inseparable part of China."267 He insisted on
"reunification by peaceful means, one country, two systems" and further asserted that the
PRC would resort to the use of force should Taiwan declare independence or face foreign
intervention.268 Despite this threat of force, the SEF on Taiwan continued to call for talks. On
April 29, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS suggesting the resumption of the Koo-Wang
Talks and regularized consultation.269 The PRC, displeased with Taiwan’s conduct, refused
this request in a letter on May 2.270 A few days later, MAC Chairman Chang King-yuh said it
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was the PRC that erected barriers against the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations. Since
the ARATS replied negatively regarding the resumption of negotiations, the government
would not seek other ways to express its willingness.271
The newly reelected President Lee called for peace, but continued to press the
contentious issues that triggered the PRC’s aggression. On May 20, 1996, in his inaugural
speech, President Lee noted the developments related to cross-Strait relations. First, the two
sides should agree on how to eradicate the hostility in their relationship. Second, both should
note the reality that the two belong to separate jurisdictions and accept the common goal of
national unification. Both should strive to foster a system in which “Chinese help
Chinese.”272 In the days following, Mainland Xinhua News Agency published an article titled
“The one-China principle is inevitable,” criticizing ROC President Lee's failure to mention
“one China” in his inaugural speech.273
PRC President Jiang Zemin also called for normalized relations while pushing his
own agenda. Giving an interview to the media while visiting in Spain on June 26, 1996, Jiang
said that the two sides could enter into cross-Strait negotiations for peaceful reunification and
follow the principle of “one China” to terminate the hostility between the two sides. Asked to
comment on a meeting between leaders of the two sides, Jiang said he would welcome the
Taiwan leader to visit the Mainland in an appropriate capacity. 274 Diplomatic tensions
continued to rise when the PRC issued a thinly veiled threat to use nuclear weapons against
Taiwan. On August 5, Sha Zukang, PRC representative for negotiations on nuclear weapons,
told the American media that the PRC had given an unconditional commitment on no-first-
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use of nuclear weapons on any foreign countries including the United States. Taiwan was just
one province of China, not a country. Therefore, the PRC's commitment did not apply to
Taiwan.275

International Recognition of Taiwan
Even as Taiwan sought peace with the Mainland, domestic decisions disrupted the
status quo. The National Development Conference was held in Taipei among the KMT, DPP,
and New Party from December 23 to 28. One major development was that the DPP joined
the KMT in support of President Lee’s policy of seeking to enhance Taiwan’s separate
diplomatic standing by winning international recognition.276
In early 1997, Taiwanese diplomats and statesmen continued to express their interest
in a more interdependent and peaceful cross-Strait relationship. In a January seminar,
“Retrospect and Prospects for Ten Years of Cross-Strait Cultural Exchanges,” MAC
Chairman Chang King-yuh urged the governments and peoples of the two sides to work for
greater exchanges of information, culture, and value systems—the three cultural links—in
order to end the grudges harbored by the two sides. 277 While the level of Taiwanese
diplomatic disruption was low, Chinese diplomatic disruption continued at high levels. On
March 9, The Fifteenth National People’s Congress adopted the “National Defense Law,”
which defined the basic principles of and operations for national defense.278 This showed that
the PRC desired to dispel international worries about the “China threat.” PRC Defense
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Minister Chi Haotian said that this law could guard against the Taiwan independence
movement and other secessionist movements that called for splitting the nation.279
Taiwanese diplomatic disruption swung from low levels, when leaders called for
negotiation, to high levels when they condemned the actions of China in Hong Kong or made
bids for increased international recognition and status. On March 13, 1997, ROC Premier
Lien Chan said the government would not reject direct cross-Strait talks, but was concerned
with how the two sides would meet, and whether the two would meet as equals.280 ROC
Minister of Foreign Affairs John Chang, while delivering a speech in European Parliament's
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security, and Defense Policy in Brussels on May 22,
indicated that Taiwan was a political entity and that the world should confront this reality. He
called for international support for Taiwan to have an appropriate international status.281 The
following day, the Government Information Office, under the Executive Yuan, issued a
position paper on U.S.-ROC Relations and pragmatic foreign policy to explain the
government's fundamental position. The paper emphasized that the ROC deserved the rights
of a sovereign state, and called for international attention to the ROC's sovereign status. It
also noted that the government strongly opposed “one country, two systems.”282 In early June,
when interviewed by the Washington Times, President Lee said, that the ROC government
hoped Hong Kong continued to prosper after the reversion of its sovereignty and that
Taiwan-Hong Kong relations and cooperation could be enhanced. The ROC, however,
opposed solving the unification of China in the Hong Kong model.283

279

“Chronology: 1997,” MAC.
Ibid.
281
FCJ Editors, “Minister’s Speech a First in European Parliament,” Taiwan Today, 30 May 1997,
http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=15310&ctNode=451 (accessed February 15, 2016).
282
“Chronology: 1997,” MAC.
283
Ibid.
280

98
Taiwan would unify on its own terms, or not at all. On July 18, 1997, MAC Chairman
Chang King-yuh, explained the four prerequisites for unification: (1) Mainland China had to
respect the reality that the ROC does exist; (2) Taiwan security would have to be guaranteed;
(3) two sides could co-exist in international organizations; and (4) Mainland China had to
renounce the use of force against Taiwan.284 In response, at the 70th anniversary of the
founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on August 1, PRC Defense Minister Chi
Haotian said, “The PRC would never renounce the use of force, specifically against the
Taiwan independence movement, movement to split the mother land, and intervention by
foreign forces.”285
Taiwan called on China’s pragmatism to set aside their differences and cooperate,
insinuating that China was acting irrationally. On August 8, 1997, MAC Vice Chairman Kao
Koong-lian said Mainland China should face the reality of the cross-Strait relations with a
pragmatic attitude. If the PRC could consider adding the words that “Taiwan and the
Mainland make up China” to further define the “one China Principle,” the ROC government
would be willing to accept this.286 On September 1, President Lee reiterated that, to extend
the olive branch, he would be willing to take with him the consensus and will of Taiwan’s
21.3 million people to visit the Mainland. He was also willing to meet with the top leadership
of Mainland China for a direct exchange of views and open up a new epoch of cross-Strait
cooperation. 287 That same day, new Premier Vincent Siew spoke on his view of the
development of cross-Strait relations. He said the two sides should (1) shelve the disputes
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over sovereignty; (2) promote pragmatic exchanges; (3) proceed with negotiations on an
equal footing; (4) carry out friendly interaction; and (5) establish a normal relationship.288

The Road to Reestablishing Stable Relations
As tensions in the Taiwan Strait continued to subside, the United States chose to
deepen its ties with China. On October 26, 1997, PRC President Jiang visited Washington, to
forge a “constructive strategic partnership” with the United States.289 Commenting on crossStrait relations after the first summit between President Clinton and President Jiang, the
MAC urged Mainland China to face the reality that the two sides belong to separate
jurisdictions, and to immediately resume the Koo-Wang talks and other institutionalized
channels with no prerequisites.290 On October 31, James P. Rubin, spokesman of U.S. State
Department, mentioned, for the first time publicly, that the United States would “not
[support] Taiwan independence.”291
The ARATS and the SEF were off to a rocky start in November 1997. On November
6, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF, inviting Secretary General Jen-ho Chiao to lead the
delegation of SEF board of directors to attend a conference on economic and trade issues,
and to tour Mainland cities.292 The next day, the SEF suggested that Chairman Koo lead a
delegation for a formal visit to meet with relevant persons, and that the ARATS was
welcome to visit Taiwan.293 Following this redirection, on November 11, an ARATS press
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release expressed regret that the SEF rejected the November 6 letter of invitation without
responding to the ARATS’ suggestion.294 This news release said SEF Secretary-General
Chiao Jen-ho was unable to attend the opening ceremony of the seminar or visit the
Mainland, thus losing the opportunity for responsible persons of the two associations to meet.
The ARATS later announced that the seminar was called off without giving any
explanation.295 In December, Taiwan began to seek talks with China without conditions. In an
interview with Sankei Shimbun of Japan, President Lee Teng-hui said that the ROC
government was willing to resume the SEF-ARATS negotiations without any
preconditions.296
Relations between China and Taiwan finally began to normalize in 1998. On January
1, ROC Premier Vincent Siew reiterated that the cross-Strait discussions should resume, and
advance step by step. He suggested that the SEF-ARATS functional negotiations should be
resumed first, and when contacts between the two sides normalized, they would not exclude
the possibility of entering into talks on other issues.297 On February 20, Taipei agreed to hold
political talks with Beijing.298 ROC Premier Siew reiterated Taipei’s consistent position on
resumption of cross-Strait exchanges and consultation in his report to the Legislature.299
China finally responded in kind on February 24, when the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF
expressing its willingness to resume cross-Strait consultation and to arrange exchanges
between the SEF and ARATS.300 On March 5, the SEF sent a letter to the ARATS welcoming
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the February 24 letter of response and indicating the intention to send appropriate members
of the SEF to the Mainland. 301 Following this exchange, the SEF made plans to send
members to the Mainland by mid-April.
Diplomatic disruption was low due to increased communications between the SEF
and ARATS in March 1998. The ARATS and SEF exchanged letters with plans to resume
formal face-to-face relations. As promised, in mid-April 1998, SEF Deputy Secretary-general
Jan Jyh-horng led a delegation visiting Beijing.302 This meeting opened the doors for further
exchanges. In May 1998, the SEF suggested that the ARATS deputy secretary-general visit
Taipei during late May.303 On June 1, the ARATS replied that it would choose an appropriate
theme for the next trip by ARATS deputy secretary-general to Taiwan at an appropriate time.
The ARATS also expressed that during this trip the ARATS deputy secretary-general would
take the opportunity to discuss Chairman Koo’s visiting the Mainland with the SEF.304 On
June 25, the ARATS agreed that SEF Chairman Koo would visit the Mainland in midSeptember or mid-October of that year. The ARATS also expressed that it would designate
its deputy secretary-general to lead an education delegation to Taiwan in late July, but
postponed the visit to the Mainland by SEF Deputy Secretary-General Jan, which was
proposed in the SEF’s letter of June 19. This letter was thus an indirect refusal of SEF Vice
Chairman Shi's proposed visit.305
In Late June 1998, the United States increased its involvement with the PRC,
indirectly opposing the actions of the ROC. U.S. President Bill Clinton flew from Andrews

301

“SEF letter to ARATS,” MAC, 5 March 1998,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=52208&ctNode=5931&mp=3 (accessed February 16, 2016).
302
“Chronology: Cross-Strait Dialogue (May 1995-October 1998),” MAC.
303
Ibid.
304
Ibid.
305
Ibid.

102
Airbase in Washington for a nine-day visit to the PRC, and stopped in five Mainland cities.306
On June 27, during the president’s visit, Jiang Zemin told Clinton in Beijing: “I hope the U.S.
Government will clearly indicate its support for China’s reunification.” 307 In Shanghai,
Clinton participated in a round table seminar on "Constructing China for the 21st Century."
He talked about the “three nos policy” on Taiwan—no support for Taiwan's independence,
no support for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," and no support for Taiwan to enter
international organizations that require statehood.308 He reiterated the U.S. position in favor
of a peaceful resolution to cross-Strait issues.309

Continued Sources of Instability
Even as the SEF-ARATS exchanges fostered stability across the Strait, ROC
President Lee stayed true to his principles and in the process, disrupted the fragile relations.
On July 22, 1998, ROC President Lee proposed “democratic unification” at the National
Unification Council meeting, urging the two sides to negotiate and reach a peace treaty under
the principle that China had separate jurisdictions.310 Within the next few days, ARATS
Deputy Secretary-general Li Ya-fei led the promised “Delegation of Beijing City Elementary
and Middle Schools for Off-Campus Visit Programs” to visit Taiwan.311
Tensions escalated again as the PRC refused to renounce the use of force against
Taiwan. On July 27, 1998, the Information Office of the State Council issued a PRC Defense
White Paper. In reference to cross-Strait relations, the white paper said that the PRC would
306
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not renounce the use of force against Taiwan. It emphasized that each sovereign state had the
right to adopt any means necessary, including military force, to safeguard the integrity of its
sovereignty and territory.312 In August, President Lee created a task force for “reinforcing the
position of the ROC as a sovereign nation.”313
Even as tensions rose among top leaders, the SEF, the ARATS, and the MAC
continued to push for increased exchanges and interdependence. On August 12, 1998, MAC
Chairman Chang said that cross-Strait negotiations should start with practical issues first and
later move to political ones. He urged Mainland authorities to stop excessive political
obstruction of cross-Strait exchanges. Chang also promoted the “new three direct links”—
exchanges of information, culture, and thoughts.314 The SEF and ARATS continued to plan
for more face-to-face talks. In September, the ARATS invited Liang Su-long, president of the
Peaceful Reunification Promotion Association Across the Taiwan Strait, to lead a delegation
to visit Beijing, Shanghai, and other cities in Northeast China.315 During Liang Su-long’s
visit, Wang expressed his hope to see “a resumption of negotiations and peaceful
unification.”316
As the Clinton Administration sought to increase ties with the PRC, the U.S.
Congress continued to push for the protection of Taiwan. On September 24, 1998, the U.S.
House of Representatives adopted the Defense Authorization Act, empowering the
Department of Defense to study the establishment of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) that
would cover the Asia-Pacific region to protect Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and other
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allies.317 In the following days, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Tang Jiaxuan arrived in
Washington for a three-day visit. On September 29, Tang met U.S. President Bill Clinton and
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright separately. At meetings, Tang said he hoped the
Taiwan issue would not affect the U.S.-PRC relationship. Tang also ruled out the possibility
that ROC President Lee visit the Mainland in his capacity as president.318 On the first of
October, the U.S. Senate adopted the joint report on Defense Authorization Act, with
stipulations that the Department of Defense should complete the feasibility study of a TMD
within a specific time and include U.S. allies—Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea—under the
shield.319
In mid-October 1998, SEF Chairman Koo traveled to the Mainland. 320 On October
14, while meeting with Chairman Koo at the Peace Hotel, Chairman Wang said that the two
sides should promptly enter into political talks and related procedural meetings for them. He
repeated the substance of the “one China” principle.321 During the second meeting between
SEF Chairman Koo and ARATS Chairman Wang at the Qinjiang Hotel in Shanghai, the two
reached four agreements: (1) enhance the dialogue to resume systematic discussions; (2)
promote exchanges of visits between SEF-ARATS staff at various levels; (3) actively
provide mutual assistance on cases arising from exchanges; and (4) arrange a Taiwan visit for
Mr. Wang at an appropriate time.322 On October 18, several SEF delegates met with Jiang
Zemin. During the meeting, Chairman Koo mentioned Taiwan's achievements in political
democratization and economic development and added that Taiwan would be willing to share
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its experiences with Mainland China. Chairman Koo emphasized that Mainland China's
democratization was the key to reunification. Having a meeting between top leaders of the
two sides could help find a mutually acceptable way to approach the topic of eventual
unification.323
The PRC and ROC continued to argue over the ROC’s bids for international
diplomatic status, the “one China” issue, and democratization of the PRC as a precondition
for unification. On October 30, 1998, regarding Mainland China’s continuing pressure on the
ROC’s diplomatic space, Premier Vincent Siew said that depriving Taiwan of its
international space and diplomatic status was an attempt to suffocate the ROC, which was by
no means acceptable.324 On November 6, PRC Vice Premier Qian Qichen said that after
Macau reverts to Chinese rule, the Taiwan side may continue its presence in Macau, but
would be required to strictly observe the “one China” principle.325 In the following days, in an
interview with Asahi Shimbun of Japan, PRC President Jiang Zemin mentioned that only
under the principle of “one China,” the two sides could touch on the post-unification issues
such as the nation’s name, national flag and anthem.326
Even as these divisive issues arose, on November 2, the Executive Yuan held the
1998 Mainland Affairs Working Meeting in Taipei to conduct extensive discussions under
the theme of “Unfolding a New Era and Promoting Friendly Interaction” between the two
sides.327
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New Deadlock
The deadlock of steady tension seemed to settle into place in December 1998. On
December 11, at the National Assembly general session on national affairs, President Lee
criticized Mainland China’s bullying of the ROC in the international community as
“hegemony.” Such a move demonstrated the PRC’s lack of ethnic compassion and its
violation of the prevalent principles of peaceful co-existence and equal treatment in the
global village. He vowed to promote pragmatic diplomacy and urged Taiwanese people to
join together to support the government’s reforms to greet the advent of the new century and
create a second Taiwan miracle.328 On December 16, MAC Vice Chairman Lin Chong-pin
emphasized that the ROC government's insistence that the Mainland's democratization must
take place prior to unification was out of four considerations: regional stability, humanitarian
considerations, legal considerations, and domestic reality.329 The following day, the Xinhua
News Agency and China News Service carried the same article, titled “The German Model is
not suitable for Chinese Unification.”330 President Lee continued to advocate that the ROC
should not give up fighting for a role in the international community.
The ARATS-SEF talks were slow to start. On December 25, 1998, ARATS Vice
Chairman Tang Shubei said that Chairman Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan should be
arranged at a time when cross-Strait political and economic dialogue could make progress. In
the following week, the ARATS held a seminar on cross-Strait relations in Beijing to fully
understand the ROC’s political developments and to solicit opinions of Taiwanese
representatives on the development of cross-Strait relations.331
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Unification began to look increasingly unlikely. On December 31, MAC Chairman
Chang King-yuh reiterated that Mainland authorities should seriously consider cooperation
proposals from the ROC government, including the establishment of a military confidencebuilding mechanism, joint efforts in the East-Asian financial crisis, assistance in the reform
of Mainland state enterprises, and exchange of democratic experiences at the grassroots level.
These programs could have helped the two sides to create a constructive cross-Strait
relationship of prosperity and reciprocity.332 The PRC was also not willing to compromise.
That same day, PRC President Jiang Zemin, in a New Year message, repeated calls for
“peaceful unification” and “one country, two systems” to resolve the Taiwan issue. He hoped
Taiwan could enter into dialogues and negotiations with the PRC as early as possible.333

Rise of Military Tension
In January 1999, China-Taiwan relations progressed from deadlock to high tensions
once more. On January 11, Wen Hui Bao of Hong Kong, quoting a Beijing authoritative
source, said that if the United States included Taiwan in their Theater Missile Defense
(TMD) system, the PRC would be “forced to make proper military adjustments to safeguard
the integrity of national sovereignty and territory.”334 In early February, Mainland China had
deployed approximately 100 missiles aimed at Taiwan along the southeastern coast. MAC
Chairman Su Chi responded, stating that for defense purposes, the ROC government was
considering joining the TMD of the United States.335
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While relations worsened between the PRC and ROC, the United States strengthened
ties with the Mainland. In April 1999, PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji paid an official visit
to the United States at the request of President Clinton.336 At the joint press conference after
the Clinton-Zhu meeting, Zhu stated that post-1997 Hong Kong development exemplified the
PRC’s strict adherence to “one country, two systems.” Conditions for unification with
Taiwan could be more relaxed, meaning that Taiwan could keep its own military forces and
the Taiwan leader could serve as deputy leader at the central government level. As for crossStrait unification, the PRC repeated its position that it would reach unification through
peaceful means, but would never renounce the use of force against Taiwan.337
From the end of April and into June 1999 diplomatic disruption grew from low to
high levels. On April 20, Chen Shui-bian argued that Taiwan and China should develop
“international special relations,”338 evidence of low-level disruption in the form of opening
negotiations. In early May the PRC tried to block the ROC from entering the World Health
Organization (WHO) since membership is only for sovereign states.339 From this medium
level disruptive action, diplomatic tension continued to rise. On May 25, the U.S. House of
Representatives released the “Cox Report,” which disclosed that the PRC had stolen U.S.
thermonuclear weapons-related secrets.340 In the following days, the PRC ambassador to the
United States refused to give a direct reply to the question whether the PRC would use
nuclear weapons against Taiwan. He claimed that it was a domestic affair to deploy nuclear
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weapons on the Mainland, in which no foreigner had a say.341 During the month of May, the
Two-State Theory, which defined “one China” as two equal countries, was finalized and
submitted to President Lee.342
The PRC called for a change in U.S. involvement in the situation. The spokesperson
of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the PRC strongly opposed the “Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act,” which was pending in the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives. The Clinton administration publicly expressed its objection to the bill and
took effective measures to prevent it from being adopted as per PRC demands.343 The next
day, the vice chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission stated that selling a TMD
system to Taiwan, including it in the program in any form, or directly or indirectly bringing
Taiwan under the umbrella of the Japan-U.S. security cooperation would constitute a serious
intrusion into the PRC’s sovereignty and territory.344

Conclusion
In this period of time between the two peaks of positive feedback, the level of
disruption decreases as I expected. U.S. diplomatic and military opposition also increased in
a predictable fashion. As Taiwan sought more power in the international system, the United
States undermined their claim of sovereignty by backing the PRC. The next section details
the events of the Taiwan Confrontation.
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JULY 9, 1999-MAY 29, 2000 (IVD3 & IntVD3)
The time from July 9, 1999 to May 29, 2000 includes the Taiwan Confrontation.
ROC President Lee Teng-hui’s insistence on his Two-State Theory incited Chinese
aggression. Chinese military disruption during this incident only reached medium levels; no
shots were fired at Taiwan. Taiwanese diplomatic disruption remained high until President
Chen Shui-bian was elected in May of 2000 and reversed Lee Teng-hui’s incendiary rhetoric.

Figure 5.4: IVD3 and IntVD3

Two-State Theory
July 1999 began with President Lee’s highly disruptive proposal of a “special stateto-state relationship”345 between China and Taiwan. On July 9, 1999, President Lee said in an
interview:
The Republic of China has been a sovereign state since it was founded in
1912. Moreover, in 1991, amendments to the Constitution designated crossstrait relations as a special state-to-state relationship. Consequently, there is no
need to declare independence. The resolution of cross-strait issues hinges on
the issue of different systems. We cannot look at issues related to the two
sides simply from the perspective of unification or independence. The Chinese
Mainland’s promise of a “one country, two systems” formula for Hong Kong
and Macau is irrelevant to Taiwan ... the ROC is a sovereign, independent
state.346
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On July 12, ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan said he was surprised at hearing Lee's
statement of “special state-to-state relationship.” Wang said that the statement would destroy
the foundation for cross-Strait talks under the “one China” principle.347Chinese military
disruption escalated in an attempt to coerce President Lee to back down. On July 16,
Chinese jet fighters began to fly across the centerline in the Taiwan Strait.348
The United States got involved on the side of China using the tool of diplomacy. On
July 18, 1999, President Clinton had a hotline telephone conversation with the PRC President
Jiang Zemin, in which Jiang criticizes Lee's statement of the “special state-to-state
relationship.” He said that the statement was a dangerous step and a serious provocation to
the “one China” principle that has been recognized by international society. Clinton
reiterated that Washington's “one China” policy remained unchanged.349 In the following
days, President Clinton outlined his “three pillars,” which includes “one China” to pacify the
PRC, “peaceful resolution” to set Taiwan at ease, and “cross-Strait dialogue” to enhance trust
and reduce tension.350
In response to Chinese military disruption, Taiwan mimicked this response and drew
up preventive strategies and built a system for “early warning, rapid reaction, and joint
operations.”351 Their first priorities focused on developing capabilities against short-range
ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, information warfare, electronic warfare, and submarine
warfare in order to ensure ROC national security.352 On July 30, 1999, SEF Chairman Koo
emphasized that the “special state-to-state relationship” was the ROC government’s position
347
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made in line with the consensus in 1993 that “One China principle can be subject to the
interpretation of the two sides respectively.”353 Koo's remarks were faxed to the ARATS right
away. However, the ARATS sent it back to the SEF in two hours, claiming that Koo's
remarks “seriously violate the ‘one China’ principle.” 354 The same day, the ARATS
Chairman called Chairman Koo’s remarks “unbecoming” adding, “the basis for ARATS-SEF
exchanges and dialogue no longer [existed].”355
Even as Taiwan tried to repair the damage to their relationship, China was not
satisfied and war looked likely once more. On August 1, 1999, the MAC appealed for a
return to the “one China, respective interpretations.”356 The next day, the PRC announced a
test fire of DF-31 ICBM, capable of hitting the continental United States.357 The Ministry of
National Defense Spokesman stated that Mainland China had test-fired its newly developed
long-range ballistic missiles on the Mainland, which is aimed at deterring superpowers, and
not Taiwan.358 That same day, the Xinhua News Agency carried a commentary titled “To stick
to the Two-State Theory is a betrayal of the Taiwanese people—a follow-up comment on
Koo Chen-fu’s statements on July 30.”359
Despite Chinese retaliation to the ROC’s idea, the MAC, the SEF and top ROC
leadership continued to press the concept of a “special state-to-state relationship.” On August
3, 1999, the MAC released the English edition of “Parity, Peace, and Win-Win: The ROC’s
Position on the ‘special state-to-state relationship.’” The MAC stated that this English
position paper would include the basic information for ROC overseas representative offices
353
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to explain the government’s stance on cross-Strait relations to international society.360 On
August 7, President Lee Teng-hui stated that the key resolution of the current tension in the
Taiwan Strait lies in economic strength, not military struggle. He said that if Taiwan
continued to promote economic development in a stable manner, the final victory would be
on its side.361

Chinese Aggression
Chinese military disruption continued to escalate. According to wire reports on
August 9, 1999, the PRC Central Military Commission prepared for major high-tech live-fire
exercise to be joined with a missile test fire at sea before the end of August, focusing on
blockading the Taiwan Straits. The exercise would last for about 10 days.362 The next day,
authoritative resources in Beijing confirmed that the PRC successfully test-fired a new longrange ground-to-ground guided missile, the DF-31, within the Mainland on August 2, the
first test-fire of this type.363
Understanding that his interpretation of the 1992 Consensus had backfired, President
Lee ordered the speaker of National Assembly not to incorporate the Two-State Theory into
the constitution.364 On August 14, 1999, CCP leaders decided that if Taiwan codified the
Two-State Theory into its Constitution, the PRC would use force against Taiwan. ARATS
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Chairman Wang said that if Lee retracted the Two-State Theory, he would still visit
Taiwan.365
The United States understood the magnitude of the situation after major military
deployments and maneuvers. On August 18, the PLA staged a massive maneuver with 100
military vehicles and 2,000 soldiers transported from Guangdong to Fujian Province.366 On
September 15, in an unprecedented move, the United States opposed Taiwan’s reentry into
the UN.367

The Jiji Earthquake
The game changed on September 21, 1999 when Jiji, in Nantou County, Taiwan was
hit by a category seven earthquake. This disaster was the second deadliest quake in
Taiwanese recorded history. That day, PRC President Jiang expressed his concern, and said
that Beijing was ready to provide all necessary assistance to reduce the damage caused by the
earthquake.368 In the following days, the ARATS stated that Mainland China was willing to
make a donation to disaster relief in Taiwan following the Jiji Earthquake, and that they were
also willing to send experts to Taiwan to assist in disaster relief. SEF Deputy Secretary
General Jan Jyh-horng responded that the Taiwanese government was grateful for Mainland
China's offer, and was willing to accept the donation, but that Mainland China would be
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notified of the government’s decision regarding the offer of material assistance and expert
personnel, after further evaluation had been undertaken.369
The ROC and PRC both closed the year 1999 with statements of their respective
concerns and priorities. Executive Yuan Premier Vincent Siew reiterated the ROC
government’s policy towards cross-Strait relations, pointing out that the four main
foundations for the development of cross-Strait relations were “national security,” “Taiwan
first,” “a win-win situation for both sides,” and “international relations.” Premier Siew said
that Taiwan would seek peaceful unification in the long term on the basis of the “special
state-to-state relationship.”370 PRC President Jiang said that important progress was made in
the great task of reunification, and that the implementation of the “One Country, Two
Systems” principle in Hong Kong and Macao had an important demonstration effect with
regard to solving the Taiwan issue. Jiang stated that the government and people of Mainland
China were confident in their ability to solve the Taiwan issue at a not too distant date,
thereby bringing about the complete reunification of China.371

Renewed Tensions
On the first of January 2000, President Lee stated that a “special state-to-state”
relationship would be a more realistic positioning of the present cross-Strait relations. Both
sides should negotiate as equals, enhance exchanges, seek common ground and resolve
differences, and strive for a win-win situation.372 In his New Year comments, President Jiang
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reiterated that both sides of the Strait could discuss any problem under the principle of “one
China.”373
On February 21, 2000, the PRC released a White Paper on “the One China Principle
and Taiwan Problem,” which listed “three ifs” for the use of force against Taiwan,374 namely,
if there occurred any major event wherein Taiwan was alienated from China under any name
or title; if another country launched an attack and conquered Taiwan; and if the Taiwan
authorities refused indefinitely to peacefully resolve the issue of cross-Strait unification
through negotiations. In these cases, the Mainland would be forced to take all possible drastic
measures, including the use of force to preserve the integrity of the Mainland's sovereignty
and territory, and to accomplish the great task of Chinese unification.375
The Taiwan Confrontation was stabilized only with a change of leadership on
Taiwan. On March 18, 2000, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu were elected the tenth president
and vice president of the ROC, and proclaimed a desire to negotiate direct links and peace
accord.376 In the following days, the Legislative Yuan agreed to open “mini-three links”377
(direct postal, transportation, and commercial links with the Mainland) as a trial run on the
offshore islands of Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu.378
Despite Taiwan’s efforts, on March 28, 2000, the Mainland deployed the latest
Russian-made S-300 missiles near Fuzhou, and deployed more in the following weeks at
Xiamen and Shantou.379 Even as this was going on, officials of TAO stated that although
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cross-Strait talks had been cut off, the functions of cross-Strait exchanges, the care of
Taiwanese businessmen, and the reception of Taiwanese visitors were still under the
responsibility of the ARATS. Therefore the ARATS would not be scrapped in the short
term.380
On May 20, 2000, Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu Hsiu-lien were officially sworn
into office as the 10th president and vice-president of the ROC. The newly elected President
then delivered his inaugural address entitled “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting
Era,” and advocates the “Four No's Plus One” policy on cross-Strait relations. Provided that
the PRC renounced the use of force against Taiwan, President Chen would not (1) declare
independence, (2) change the national title from “the Republic of China” to “the Republic of
Taiwan,” (3) include the doctrine of “special state-to-state” relations in the ROC
Constitution, or (4) promote a referendum on unification or independence.381
Neither the United Stats, nor the PRC trusted President Chen to keep his word and
promote stability in the Strait. Under his leadership, Taiwan would be steered closer to
independence than in the time of President Lee. On May 29, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen
clearly expressed that “Taiwan [was] part of the Republic of China, and that the Republic of
China [was] an independent and sovereign country.”382 She also emphasized that whether
Taiwan would re-unite with the Mainland, declare independence, or maintain the status quo,
the new administration would be open about it.383

380

“Chronology 2000,” MAC.
Chen Shui-bian, “Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era,” 20 May 2000,
http://taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=17992&ctNode=103 (accessed March 16, 2016).
382
“Chronology 2000,” MAC.
383
Ibid.
381

118
Conclusion
The Taiwan Confrontation of 1999 began as a result of President Lee’s highly
disruptive diplomatic statements that Taiwan was a sovereign state since 1912. The Mainland
responded with high-level diplomatic and medium level military disruption. The United
States was not deeply involved in this incident. The actions of China and Taiwan for the most
part corrected themselves through the actions of top leadership, and the voters on Taiwan.

MAY 30, 2000 – MAY 30, 2002 (IV2+ & IntV2+)
In the span of time between May 30, 2000 and May 30, 2002, Taiwanese diplomatic
disruption swung from low in the aftermath of the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, to high as
President Chen increased support for DPP politics, especially in his pro-independence
rhetoric. Chinese military and diplomatic disruption shifted from low to high in response to
the statements and actions of President Chen. The United States was only minimally involved
in the Strait during this time.

Figure 5.5: IV2+ and IntV2+

Increasing Stability
China-Taiwan relations in the period following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation were
tense but stable. Despite political differences, cultural links between the Chinese and
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Taiwanese people continued to deepen. In June 2000, the Mainland hosted a religious
pilgrimage in Fujian Province for the Goddess Mazu. However, the PRC did not make the
pilgrimage easy for the Taiwanese. Four principles were to be observed by the Taiwanese
people participating in the religious pilgrimage to the goddess Matsu on the Mainland,
namely, (1) under the condition of one China, the implementation of direct two-way
transportation for mutual benefit and reciprocity, and no docking at a third port is allowed;
(2) cross-Strait routes are special domestic routes, wherein only ships of both sides are
allowed to operate. If this poses a difficulty for Taiwan, it can rent ships of Mainland
companies, or even Hong Kong registered vessels, but it cannot rent foreign vessels; (3) ships
entering ports can either raise flags bearing a mark or the company's logo, or not carry any
flag at all; and (4) pilgrimage participants intending to visit other sightseeing spots should
apply for a Taiwanese compatriot certificate before making the trip.384
Diplomatic disruption from both China and Taiwan remained low for the rest of the
year. On July 13, 2000, ARATS Chairman Wang stated that “there have been adjustments in
the independence stance of Taiwan’s new leadership; however, there is a need to continue
observing,” and reiterated that Taiwanese authorities should revert to the consensus in 1992
wherein each side makes its own interpretation of “one China.”385 “This is the foundation of
cross-Strait dialogue.”386 In August, the Mainland decided to end the phase wherein the
statements and actions of Taiwan’s newly-elected President Chen would be closely
monitored, and started the phase of waging a tit-for-tat struggle in which goodwill was met
with goodwill and malice with malice.387 In October, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen said
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that the cross-Strait policy of the administration was centered on the “Spirit of 1992,” hoping
for both sides of the Strait to strengthen exchanges and put aside differences. Although
Taiwan had not accepted the Mainland’s version of “One China,” it would not deliberately
challenge it.388 A few days later, President Chen reiterated that the ROC Government would
show its utmost sincerity and patience in searching for the “goodwill reconciliation, active
cooperation, and permanent peace” for both sides of the Strait.389 He called on the leaders of
both sides of the Strait to revert to the “Spirit of 1992,” put aside mutual differences, and
resume dialogues and exchanges as soon as possible.390

Another Period of Increased Tension
New differences in opinion arose between the two polities, creating renewed but less
severe tensions across the Strait. On January 12, 2001, President Chen Shui-bian expressed
that the integration he had in mind was patterned after that of the European Union, in which
three concepts were involved: sovereignty, freedom, and self-will.391 Later that month, the
MAC issued three statements in response to Qian Qichen's statement on the 6th anniversary
of “Jiang Zemin's Eight-Point Proposal.” The MAC reiterated its desire to sit down and talk
with Mainland authorities without setting any preconditions and pre-set positions, and start a
dialogue on issues that concern both sides.392 In response to President Chen’s January 12
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remarks, PRC President Jiang Zemin expressed on March 23, that the confederation or
federal system was not applicable to cross-Strait unification.393
Military tensions rose as China once again stockpiled offensive weaponry and
conducted military exercises. On May 31, 2001, the Mainland prepared to hold large-scale
military exercises of its ground, air, and naval forces, and strategic missile units at Dongshan
Island in Fujian Province. Su-27 fighter planes bought from Russia were also to be used at
the exercises. The large-scale landing exercises would have Taiwan as the imaginary target
of the attack. The objective was to simulate air domination on the Taiwan Strait.394
In the face of this military threat, President Chen chose to introduce the “New Five
Nos Policy,” on April 27, 2001. The following are his new promises to promote stability in
the Strait: (1) Weapons purchases from and stopovers in the United States were not to be
considered provocative to the PRC; (2) The ROC government would not misread the crossStrait situation; (3) Taiwan would not be a pawn of any country; (4) Taipei never abandoned
its sincerity and its efforts to improve cross-Strait relations; and (5) cross-Strait ties were not
zero-sum. 395 In July, President Chen expressed that the “one country, two systems”
framework was attempting to make Taiwan similar to the “Hong Kong” model, in which
certain systems, freedom, and human rights needed the approval of Mainland authorities to
take effect. This was not acceptable to the majority of the Taiwanese people.396
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A Lack of U.S. Involvement
U.S. involvement in this period was diplomatically and militarily light. On August 28,
2001, the Washington Times reported that according to the latest intelligence data of the
United States, the Mainland had deployed M-type short-range ballistic missiles along the
coastal provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang. The number of these missiles increased from 300
in April to more than 350. The U.S. reconnaissance satellite at the same time discovered that
a new M-M missile base was spotted around the Jiangshan area in Zhejiang Province in
July.397 While Chinese military disruption escalated, so did Taiwanese diplomatic disruption.
On November 11, 2001, during a meeting with former U.S. Secretary of Defense William S.
Cohen, President Chen stated that the Mainland believed that the principle of “One China”
was the “1992 Consensus.” He went on to say that to set the “one China principle as a
pre-condition for resuming talks [was] a disguised refusal to negotiate. We [went] over every
document, and there [was] no so-called ‘consensus.’ This has been unilaterally decided by
the Mainland, and has not gained the approval of Taiwan.”398
Taiwan continued to insist that China renounce the use of force in its dealings with
Taiwan. In his New Year’s Day Message in 2002, President Chen Shui-bian reiterated that
once the Mainland abandoned the threat of force and respected the people’s choice of free
will, both sides of the Strait could begin cultural, trade, and economic integration, and
proceed toward a new framework of permanent peace and political integration.399 Taiwan
wanted to put the United States at ease. On January 5, in a meeting with the visiting

397

The Washington Times, “China Increases Missile Threats,” Washington Times, 28 August 2001,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2001/aug/28/20010828-025009-8760r/ (accessed march 16, 2016).
398
“Chronology 2001,” MAC.
399
Chen Shui-Bian, “New Year’s Message 2002,” MAC, 1 January 2002,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68081&ctNode=5910&mp=3&xq_xCat=2002 (accessed March 16,
2016).

123
delegation of the “U.S.-China Security Review Commission,” President Chen proposed a
three-equilibrium scheme, which was to seek political, economic, and military equilibrium in
cross-Strait relations, and to establish a constructive cooperation, not antagonistic exclusion.
At the same time, he expressed the hope that the United States could play the role of
stabilizer, balancer, and moderator in cross-Strait relations, in order to build a platform of
peaceful contact and dialogue for both sides of the Strait.400
In early May 2000, President Chen expressed the need for permanent peace across the
Strait. He said that the normalization of cross-Strait relations needed to start from the
normalization of trade and economic relations. Second, both sides of the Strait should reopen
talks in order to minimize misunderstandings and misjudgments. Third, the cross-Strait
“Three-Links” were a road that needed to be taken, and that the “Mini-Three-Links” were the
first step toward this goal.401 Later that month President Chen expressed that Taiwan was a
sovereign independent country, and was not part of the PRC. The majority of the Taiwanese
people rejected the “one country, two systems” and hoped for the maintenance of the status
quo. Therefore, during his term, he would not declare independence, change the name of the
country, or hold any public referendum. Chen believed, as long as both sides of the Strait
disavowed political maneuvering and focused on economic benefits, the issues with regard to
the “Three-Links” would soon be resolved.402 This uneasy truce became the status quo.
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Conclusion
In the two years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, tensions lessened then
worsened as President Chen continued to be politically divisive in the fashion of his
predecessor Lee Teng-hui. The level of Taiwanese diplomatic disruption escalated from low
to medium, reached high, then returned to low. Chinese diplomatic disruption rose from low
to medium in this period. The United States did not actively participate in the de-escalation
process in this period.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
MAY 31, 2002 – MAY 30, 2004 (DV2+)
Following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, China-Taiwan relations remained
unstable. Diplomatic conflict was in general a level three: Taiwan and China showed hostility
toward one another, but were open to negotiations with a third party. The United States,
focused on more pressing global events such as the War on Terror, still fulfilled their
obligation to Taiwan as per the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. However, economic and
diplomatic relations between the United States and China continued to increase.
The level of diplomatic conflict began at level two in this period: within existing
channels of communication, one or the other actor complicated negotiations. On June 24,
2002, the TAO Deputy Director and the ARATS Vice Chairman stated that the Mainland
would carry on the principles of “one China, direct two-way, and reciprocity and mutual
benefit” in the promotion of cross-Strait “Three-Links.”403 The following day, the TAO
Director said that as long as the “Three-Links” were referred to as “domestic routes within a
country,” they would be applicable to air transport and sea transport. The “Three-Links”
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would commence just as well. Moreover, as long as Taiwan’s DPP retained the Taiwanese
independence clause in its party platform, it would be impossible for the Mainland to hold
party-to-party talks with the DPP.404 While negotiations proved difficult, the ARATS and the
SEF continued to send officials to meet on both the Mainland and on Taiwan. On June 27,
the Deputy Chairman of ARATS arrived in Taipei as the head of a visiting delegation.405
U.S.-China relations were upset on July 12, when the U.S. Department of Defense
submitted the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China to the
U.S. Congress. 406 Two days later, in response to this report the PRC Foreign Affairs
Spokesperson revealed that the Mainland was increasing its military deployment against
Taiwan, and stated that the Mainland had never joined any arms competitions, and hoped that
the U.S. Government would earnestly abide by the principles of the three Sino-U.S.
communiqués, and would refrain from sending incorrect signals to the Taiwanese separatist
forces.407
Diplomatic conflict escalated and plateaued at a level three: hostility toward
negotiation with one another and/or openness to negotiation with a third party. On July 25,
2002, The MAC issued a statement expressing that the ROC had always hoped that
cross-Strait relations would develop toward positive interaction. However, the Mainland
criticized Taiwan's president, which only worsened the cross-Strait relationship.408 In early
August, in a live video link from the Office of the President, President Chen Shui-bian
delivered the opening address:
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Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, diminished,
marginalized, or downgraded as a local entity… Taiwan is a sovereign
independent country. Simply put, it must be clear that Taiwan and China are
each one country on each side of the strait.409
President Chen went on to complain that the Mainland had not abandoned the use of force
against Taiwan, and it continued to suppress Taiwan in the international arena. This was a
great offense to the feelings of the Taiwanese people.410
China feared that Taiwan would seek independence following this and other ROC
statements. On August 15, 2002, the TAO Spokesperson Li Weiyi released his reaction to
“Chen Shui-bian's Advocacy of Taiwanese Independence,” which expressed that the
Mainland would firmly and unchangeably oppose the Taiwanese independence groups
dividing the country and would work for the realization of the unification of the country. The
Mainland would never allow anybody to take Taiwan away from “China” in any way. It
warned the “Taiwanese separatist forces” not to incorrectly assess the situation, and to rein in
the horse in time and stop all separatist activities.411 In September, President Chen called the
Mainland’s waging of a long-term “ultra-limit war” against Taiwan, basically similar to any
terrorist attack in nature. The fear and threat caused by the Mainland's deployment of 400
missiles along the coastal area of the Taiwan Strait had long surpassed the limit of a terrorist
attack.412
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October and November 2002 continued the trend of level three diplomatic conflict.
The TAO argued that cross-Strait relations were neither international nor state-to-state.413 On
November 8, the Mainland’s General Secretary Jiang Zemin made his political report titled,
“Build a Well-off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” at the 16th Communist Party Congress. The section
on Taiwan policy mentioned for the first time the new three-stage theory of the principle of
“one China.” 414 While China insisted on the “one China” principle, Taiwan demanded
democratization as a precondition for negotiation. On November 9, President Chen proposed
“democracy and peace” as a precondition to the resumption of cross-Strait negotiations and
expressed that the Mainland had waged a long-term “unrestricted war” on Taiwan, and had
attempted to rapidly destroy Taiwan's political, economic, financial, and military facilities by
using “Fifth Column” strategies without any warning.415
The diplomatic exchange among top leaders may have been contentious, but the SEF
and ARATS continued to make headway. On December 1, 2002, Dr. Koo Chen-fu, Chairman
of the Fifth Board of Directors, expressed that both sides must strive to improve relations and
invited ARATS Chairman Wang to Taiwan to renew talks.416 The PRC continued to seek
stable relations with the United States by justifying their actions against Taiwan. On
December 3, PRC Ambassador Yang Jiechi said in a speech on “China-U.S. Relations in the
new century” that the Mainland's deployment of missiles targeted against Taiwan was a

413

“Chronology 2002,” MAC.
Jiang Zemin, “Build a Well-Off Society in an All-Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building
Socialism With Chinese Characteristics,” Beijing Review, 8 November 2002,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/24/content_360557.htm (accessed March 16, 2016).
415
“Chronology 2002,” MAC.
416
Ibid.
414

128
matter involving national security, and should be understood and supported by the United
States.417
In response to the PRC buildup of offensive weaponry and military threats, on
December 9, 2002, the Taiwan’s 2002 Defense White Paper was released. The paper includes
a long list of objectives including “maintain air superiority and naval dominance,” and,
“establish an excellent and modernized military force to best perform the concept of
‘effective deterrence, resolute defense.’”418 Under these guidelines, Taiwan was to rely on
domestic products for national defense and supplement with foreign products.
The level of diplomatic conflict decreased as China and Taiwan shifted focus to
economic issues. On December 18, MAC Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen stated that the
Government’s future cross-Strait policy would build “a platform of” cross-Strait exchanges,
and hoped that it would also attract Mainland capital, human resources, and tourists to
Taiwan, in order to correct the present situation of uni-directional trend.419 In his year-end
statement, President Chen pointed out that the policies of “richly cultivating Taiwan while
reaching out to the world” and “proactive liberalization with effective management” could
produce a win-win situation for both sides of the Strait, and hoped that the authorities of both
sides would create collective benefits for the interests of Taiwanese businessmen and the
development of cross-Strait trade and economy through negotiations and dialogue.420
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New Year, Same Problems
In early 2003, the level of diplomatic conflict in the Taiwan Strait swung between one
and three. In his New Year Day Message, President Chen Shui-bian said that both sides
needed to establish an “interaction framework for peace and stability,” which could serve as
a major objective in the present stage to which both sides could strive for together.421 In the
following days, the Spokesperson of the TAO agreed with President Chen and expressed that
cross-Strait relations would gain a significant improvement as long as Taiwan's leaders
considered the interests of the Taiwanese compatriots, sincerely approved of cross-Strait
direct links and agreed to resume dialogue and negotiations under the foundation of the
“1992 Consensus” reached by the SEF and ARATS.422
In his New Year’s message, Mainland CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao said that in
the new year, the Mainland would continue to be firm in its stance of “peaceful unification
and one country, two systems,” and its goal of unification. He reiterated that the PRC
supported the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue and negotiations under the foundation of
the principle of “one China,” the reinforcement of cross-Strait interactions and exchanges,
the active promotion of cross-Strait direct “Three-Links,” and the firm opposition of any
separatist movement of “Taiwanese independence” advocates.423 Following this, President
Chen called for more sincere negotiations and dialogue in order to stabilize the region.424 The
PRC finally decoupled economic talks from political posturing. On January 15, the PRC Vice
Premier Qian Qichen indicated that the cross-Strait “Three-Links” were an economic affair,
421
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and that negotiations did not need to involve the political significance of “one China,” but
should be actively promoted based on the principle that “political divergence should not
affect or interfere with the spirit of cross-Strait economic cooperation.”425
Despite this progress in the economic sphere, the PRC and ROC continued to set
unrealistic preconditions for diplomatic talks. In early March, CPP General Secretary Hu
Jintao emphasized that so long as Taiwan accepted the principle of “one China” and the
“1992 Consensus,” negotiations could resume.426 The problem with this statement is that
when President Lee tried to define what “one China” meant to Taiwan, it led to the 1999
Taiwan Confrontation. The SEF-ARATS talks continued to be on hold due to the recent
political conflicts between both sides of the Strait.427

SARS Outbreak
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak began as early as
November 2002 in Guangdong Province on the Mainland. It spread to Taiwan in March
2003. Mainland officials offered to assist Taiwan in SARS prevention, but repeatedly took
advantage of the issue to refer to Taiwan as a province of China. On April 14, the MAC
issued a statement that Taiwan was not a province of the PRC, and that it did not welcome
Mainland officials taking advantage of the SARS epidemic to take politically-motivated
actions.428
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China continued to oppose Taiwan in the international arena. In response to Taiwan’s
bid to enter the World Health Organization (WHO), Zhang Qiyue, the Spokesperson for the
Mainland's PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry, stated at a press conference on May 15, 2003, that
as a province of China, Taiwan was neither qualified to join the World Health Organization
(WHO) nor to participate in the World Health Assembly (WHA) in an observer capacity.429
As the SARS epidemic continued, Taiwan responded to China’s offer of aid. On May 25, the
SEF politely refused in a formal letter the Mainland’s offer of medical resources, explaining
that the resources in Taiwan were “sufficient.” The SEF also requested that the ARATS
positively regard Taiwan’s need to participate in the WHO.430
The third party intervention from the United States remained at a level three. The
United States deepened relations with the PRC through economic and diplomatic means. On
June 1, 2003, in a meeting at the G8 Summit in France, PRC President Hu Jintao and U.S.
President George H. W. Bush stated that the Taiwan Issue had all along been the most
important issue in Sino-U.S. relations. Remaining firm in its guiding principles of “peaceful
reunification and one country, two systems,” the Chinese Government was willing to exert its
best effort to fight for the materialization of cross-Strait reunification through peaceful
means.431
Economic and diplomatic relations across the Taiwan Strait began to improve with
the gradual easing of the SARS epidemic. On June 19, 2003, Zhang Mingqing, the
Spokesperson for the TAO, said that it hoped that cross-Strait exchanges would return to
normal as soon as possible following the reduction of the SARS epidemic. The Mainland
429
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side would take corresponding measures depending on the actions to be taken by the Taiwan
side.432 While the PRC used economic incentives as a carrot to entice the ROC toward
unification, it also continued work on a rather large stick. On June 20, 2003, the Mainland’s
Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs met for the first time. In that meeting, Hu Jintao
mentioned the three priority-works concerning Taiwan: stopping U.S. intervention in
cross-Strait affairs, enhancing cross-Strait exchanges, and strengthening the military to
counteract unexpected incidents.433

The Road to Referendum
Taiwan continued to press the PRC to renounce the use of force. On July 4, 2003,
President Chen said that if there were to be changes in the status quo, then the decisions
would be made by the people through a popular vote public referendum. Otherwise, no
country, government, political party, or individual could change Taiwan's destiny, its future,
or its present status as an independent entity independent status quo. The President also
reiterated that as long as the Mainland was willing to abandon the use of force against
Taiwan during his term, he guaranteed that the “Four Nos Plus One” policy would remain
unchanged.434 Essentially, President Chen threatened to disrupt the status quo via public
referendum if the PRC did abandon the threat of conquering Taiwan by military means. In
October, the President Hu Jintao met with President George W. Bush and said that China
would never tolerate Taiwan independence.435
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In response to Chen’s proposed referendum and new constitution, the Mainland
Xinhua News Agency released a commentary “exposing Chen Shui-bian's political fraud” in
November severely attacking President Chen’s real intention of carrying out Taiwanese
independence under the guise of a public referendum.436 Later that month, the TAO issued the
first direct threat of force against Taiwan if independence was declared.437 In the following
days, the Legislative Yuan passed the “Referendum Law,”438 which could potentially be used
to declare independence from the Mainland. In response, the PRC deployed 496 ballistic
missiles within a radius of 600 kilometers and carried out military exercises for the purpose
of attacking Taiwan at any time. President Chen then stated that in order to ensure Taiwan's
sovereignty and public security, a “defensive referendum” would be held on March 21,
2004.439
On December 5, 2003, President Chen offered China an ultimatum. In a special
interview with the New York Times, President Chen announced that the topic of the defensive
referendum was that “the 23 million people of Taiwan [would] firmly demand that the PRC
immediately withdraw all the ballistic missiles aiming at Taiwan and also openly and
publicly announce and promise that they [would] not use force against Taiwan.”440 He also
said that if the leadership in China responded with goodwill and agreed to immediately
withdraw all the ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan, and openly announced that they would

436

“Chronology 2003,” MAC.
Ibid.
438
Ibid.
439
Ibid.
440
Ibid.
437

134
not use force against Taiwan, then Taiwan would not hold a defensive referendum on March
20, 2004.441
In order to reframe the situation, China targeted Taiwan’s democratic process. On
December 7, in a meeting with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York, PRC
Premier Wen Jiabao expressed that Beijing understood the demands of the Taiwanese people
for democracy. He added that, “however, the separatist forces of the Taiwan administration
are attempting to split Taiwan away from China under the guise of democracy, which we
shall not tolerate.” He further emphasized that as long as there was a ray of hope, the Chinese
government would never abandon using peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue.442 This
last was supposed to reassure Taiwan that although the PLA had weapons trained on the
Island, that as long as independence was not declared, force would not be used.
In year of 2004, tensions maintained their steady pace. President Chen called for
peace and pledged his commitment to the “Four Nos Plus One” promise as long as China was
willing to accept the outcome of the upcoming presidential election.443 Chinese Premier Hu
Jintao reiterated the Mainland position that Taiwanese independence would be met with
severe consequences.444

Taiwanese Espionage Case
On January 14, 2004, the PRC caught seven Taiwanese as they collected intelligence
at the Guangzhou Huangpu shipyard. Following President Chen’s public disclosure that he
441
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was aware of the position of Chinese military bases, and missiles aimed at the island, the
intelligence network on the Mainland was crushed.445 The ARATS informed the SEF of the
case against the seven spies. They had confessed everything about their identities and
espionage activities. Their case was being processed.446 Following this letter on January 16,
the MAC released a statement on the alleged “Taiwanese Espionage Case” pointing out that
they had “reasons to suspect that this [was] the Mainland’s intention to influence the
development of Taiwan's domestic political situation and to manipulate Taiwan’s
elections.”447
President Chen explained the “One Principle and the Four Major Issue Areas” on
February 2, 2004. The “One Principle” was “Establishing the Principle of Peace.” The “Four
Major Issue Areas” were, the establishment of a negotiation mechanism, exchanges based on
equality and reciprocity, the establishment of a political relationship, and the prevention of
military conflicts. President Chen stressed that after the March 20 presidential election, he
would invite Mainland China to work towards the initiation of cross-Strait negotiation.448
During this time, the United States during tried to be as detached as possible while
still fulfilling its obligations according to treaties. On March 1, 2004, President Chen
approved the long-delayed procurement of advanced weaponry from the United States.449 In
an exclusive interview with the LA Times on March 6, President Chen Shui-bian guaranteed
that the Taiwan issue would not become a burden on the United States. In the next four years,
Taiwan would maintain the status quo, and Chen would continue efforts to prevent the status
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quo from being unilaterally changed.450 On March 20, Chen narrowly won reelection. On
March 31, in an interview with the BBC, President Chen stated that it was his top priority to
improve and stabilize cross-Strait relations in the next four years.451
The PRC attempted to pit the United States against Taiwan. On April 14, 2004, PRC
President Hu Jintao during his meeting with U.S. Vice President Cheney stated that the
greatest threat to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait was the Taiwanese separatist
movement. He also demanded that the United States honor its commitments and oppose
Taiwan independence and any words or deeds by Taiwan leaders to unilaterally change the
status quo of Taiwan.452

The Inauguration of President Chen
On May 20, 2004 President Chen delivered his inaugural address, “Paving the Way
for a Sustainable Taiwan.” Regarding Cross-Strait relations, the President emphasized
goodwill, peace, and development, and reiterated that the principles and his promise made
during his inaugural address on May 20 in 2000 had not changed over the past four years, nor
would they change in the next four years.453 Later that month, Hong Kong newspaper
Takungpao reported that the Mainland’s armed forces would hold joint military exercises at
Dongshan Island in Fujian in June. It is the first time that the objective of the exercises was
“to vie for air domination over the Taiwan Strait.”454 On June 7, The Hong Kong Wenweipo
reported that Mainland authorities have stated that if the United States did not sell advanced
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weapons to Taiwan, the Mainland would consider withdrawing the ballistic missiles
deployed along its southeastern coast.455 In reaction to this, on June 16, President Chen stated
that in facing the growing threats of the Mainland, only by transcending political parties and
strengthening self-defense capabilities could Taiwan’s military forces be able to effectively
deter, a possible PRC military venture.456

Conclusion
In the two years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, diplomatic conflict was in
general a level three: Taiwan and China showed hostility toward one another, but were open
to negotiations with a third party. The United States was focused on other parts of the world,
namely the Middle East in President Bush’s War on Terror. Bound by the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979, the United States continued to sell defensive systems to Taiwan. However,
economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and China were only
deepening. Cross-Strait Relations did not stabilize into the “1992 Consensus” until KMT Ma
Ying-jeou was elected President in March 2008.

JUNE 9, 1991 – JUNE 8, 1993 (DV2-)
Introduction
In general, China-Taiwan relations in the early 1990s looked promising. Diplomatic
relations between the two governments improved with the creation of the SEF on Taiwan and
the ARATS on the Mainland. The United States continued to improve economic relations
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with the PRC and fulfill its obligations to Taiwan according to the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act.

Context of Improved Relations
Cross-Strait relations were on a track to improve in 1991. The Executive Yuan
established the MAC in January, the SEF in February, and drew up the “Guidelines for
National Reunification in March.457 The guideline stipulated that: (1) The existence of the
Republic of China was a simple reality that could not be denied; (2) “One China” referred to
China as a historical, geographical, cultural, and racial entity; and (3) Unification was
inevitable, but mutual hostilities had to be eradicated. Each had to include one another in the
international arena and renounce the use of force for unification.458
In April 1991, President Lee announced that the Beijing regime would no longer be
regarded by Taiwan as a rebel organization.459 This demonstrated that the ROC had formally
renounced military force as a means of national unification. Therefore, military disruption
was not a very important measure of the independent variable of study during this time. This
diplomatic gesture also showed that the ROC government would no longer compete for the
“right to represent China” in the international arena.
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Relative Peace in the Strait
Even in June 1991, China had formulated its position on “peaceful unification; one
country, two systems.”460 This had not yet become a contentious issue. In 1991, the TAO
made its first “June 7 Statement,” of which the major element was to suggest to Taiwan:
“Relevant agencies, delegated bodies, and individuals from both sides of the Strait should, as
soon as possible, bring discussions to solve the issues of the ‘three links’ and bilateral
exchanges.” 461 Additionally, it suggested “the Communist Party of China and the
Kuomintang of China should send representatives to engage in contacts, so as to create
conditions for the progress of negotiations for a formal end to hostilities and gradual peaceful
unification.”462
Diplomatic relations were improved on both sides through the expansion of economic
ties. On July 2, 1991, the spokesman of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade introduced the following five principles to promote cross-strait economic and trade
relations: (1) direct and two-way trade, (2) mutually beneficial relations, (3) many trading
areas, (4) stable and long-term relations, (5) abiding by agreements.463
During this period, the seeds of future problems were sown. In October 1991, the
DPP introduced the “Independence Clause” into its party charter. It aimed to establish the
“Republic of Taiwan” with independent sovereignty, drafting a new constitution, and holding
referendums.464 This was met with considerable KMT backlash. In November, Taiwan joined
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the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum under the name “Chinese Taipei.”465
China only allowed Taiwan to participate in international organizations and activities as
“Chinese Taipei,” or a similar title. This generated a high tide of separatist feeling in
Taiwan.466 In December 1991, China-Taiwan relations continued to improve. On December
16, the TAO created the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) to
promote contacts with Taiwan and eventual reunification.467

A New Year of Cooperation
January 1992 began an era of communications across the Taiwan Strait through the
SEF and ARATS. On January 8, the ARATS sent a letter to the SEF to invite their chairman,
the vice chairman, or the secretary-general to lead a delegation to visit Beijing and exchange
views on enhancing communications and cooperation.468 On June 16, secret envoys agreed to
hold the first “Koo-Wang talks” in Singapore.469 ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan sent a
letter on August 4, to invite SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu for a meeting to exchange views on
economic development and SEF-ARATS affairs and discuss related programs.470
On August 8, the National Unification Council (NUC) of the ROC approved the
resolution on the “Definition of One China,”471 which states, “both sides of the Taiwan Straits
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agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Straits have different
opinions as to the meaning of ‘one China.’”472 This became the basis for the 1992 Consensus.
U.S. involvement in Taiwan at this point in time was largely arms sales to promote
the defense of Taiwan. On September 2, 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced his
decision to sell 150 F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan.473 These sales did not yet hamper ChinaTaiwan Relations. Later that month, the “Statutes Governing Relations between People of the
Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” and its by-laws were enacted. These laws were made
for the purpose of handling legal matters that could arise before national unification.474
On September 30, the ARATS suggested to the SEF that they hold a preparatory
meeting on the Mainland to settle the time, place, and agenda of the planned “Koo-Wang
Talks.”475 This practical meeting took place in Hong Kong in late October. In November, the
SEF proposed that each side express its interpretation of “one China” verbally and based its
own interpretation on the August 8 resolution of the NUC.476 In response, the ARATS “fully
respected and accepted” SEF’s suggestion to verbally interpret “one China” respectively.477
Even as Taiwan improved diplomatic relations with China, it was still negotiating
arms deals to arm itself against a possible attack. On November 18, Taiwan signed a deal to
procure 60 Mirage-2000 jet fighters from France.478 In December, the SEF sent a letter to the
ARATS that emphasized that the top priority of the practical meeting was to solve
substantive issues. As to the substance of “one China,” the ROC had been consistent in
472
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following the Guidelines for National Unification and decisions of the NUC.479 The ROC
stance was that each side of the Strait was governed by a separate political entity. When
China was asked to comment on the ROC position in December, ARATS Vice Chairman
Tang Shubei said that the PRC’s stance on that issue had been consistent and against the
statement of “two political entities.”480 Tang said such a statement was not helpful for
improving cross-Strait relations.481

Complications and Collaboration
In the year 1993, U.S.-China relations became complicated, while China-Taiwan
relations benefited from the collaborative efforts of the SEF and ARATS. On January 21,
William Jefferson Clinton was inaugurated as the President of the United States.482 The focus
of his China policy was the renewal of the most favored nation (MFN) treatment. There was
initial pressure from human rights groups to use trade as leverage to pressure the PRC to
improve its human rights record moving forward. The Clinton Administration eventually
decided to delink human rights improvement and trade relations, a major change in U.S.
policy.483
That same day on January 21, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs made public the
White Paper on ROC Foreign Policy. It stipulated that the ROC’s foreign policy is oneChina, two entities, and equality at the interim. The policy paper said that the government
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would pursue an international space, with a long-term goal of returning to the UN and the
eventual goal of China’s unification.484
In March 1993, the SEF-ARATS talks continued to move forward. On March 2, the
SEF suggested to the ARATS that they hold the next round of “Koo-Wang Talks” in late
March or early April. At the preparatory meeting for the upcoming “Koo-Wang Talks,”
MAC Vice Chairman Kao Koong-lian said that the talks would cover four issues—
SEF-ARATS affairs, cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges, cultural exchanges, and a
joint combat against crime. The protection of Taiwanese investment might be added to the
agenda.485 The talks were held in Singapore from April 27-29. SEF Chairman Koo and
ARATS Chairman Wang signed four agreements: (1) the Agreement of Document
Authentication, (2) the Agreement on Tracing of and Compensation for Lost Registered
Mail, (3) the Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and Communication
Channels between the SEF and ARATS, and (4) the Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement.486

Conclusion
From 1991 to June 1993 the level of diplomatic conflict was generally low. China and
Taiwan benefited from economic and legal cooperation of the SEF and ARATS
organizations. Third party intervention was observed at level four due to U.S arms deals with
Taiwan, but a level three when the United States deepened economic relations with China. I
observed military conflict in the Taiwan Strait at level two, when Taiwan continued to
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stockpile weapons in preparation for a potential Chinese attack. Overall, the level of conflict
during this period was low.

SUMMARY
In this chapter, I measured the independent and intervening variables during five
periods in order to capture the formation and decline of a positive feedback cycle. I then
examined the resultant level of conflict in the Taiwan Strait before and after the time
designated as the positive feedback cycle. I found that the level of conflict was still medium
to high in the aftermath of the 1999 Confrontation. China-Taiwan relations did not stabilize
until a pro-unification leader was elected president in Taiwan in 2008.487

487

Due to the constraints of my methodology, this event was not included in my case study, though it would
have strengthened my argument and application of the PE Model.

145
CHAPTER SIX:
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for decades persist
despite periods of extreme tension and change? How have the foreign policy decisions of
each state in the system helped to manage the persistent deadlock? To answer these
questions, I used the punctuated equilibrium (PE) model to explore the positive feedback
cycles of the Taiwan Strait Crises and the process by which the negative feedback cycle was
reinstituted. According to Baumgartner and Jones, a positive feedback mechanism, or
punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs, often as a result of
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting
mechanism, which Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones state, equalizes any outside force to
create a stable output. I hypothesized that if the level of positive feedback generated between
China and Taiwan were to increase, then the level of negative feedback from the United
States would increase, resulting in a lower level of conflict. To test my hypothesis, I used a
theory-guided case study approach. Case 1 discussed the First and Second Taiwan Strait
Crises of the 1950s. Case 2 examined the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan
Confrontation. My independent variable examined Chinese diplomatic disruption, Taiwanese
diplomatic disruption, Chinese military disruption, and Taiwanese military disruption. The
intervening variable of this study included four components: U.S. diplomatic opposition to
China and to Taiwan, as well as U.S. military opposition to China and to Taiwan. Each case
study encompassed two crises and formed one positive feedback cycle.
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In this chapter I analyze my findings and present conclusions. In the first sections, I
analyze the independent, intervening, and dependent variables to make lateral comparisons
across both cases. (Continue when chapter is finished)

ANALYSIS
This section draws comparisons between the two case studies. I first analyze the
independent and intervening variable measures, then compare the results of the dependent
variable for both cases. I intend to show how the PE Model can help explain deadlock in the
Taiwan Strait.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
The independent variable for study is the level of positive feedback generated
between China and Taiwan. Taiwanese Diplomatic Disruption is the first component of the
independent variable. Based on the PE Model, I expected the level of Taiwanese diplomatic
disruption for both cases to increase in the two years prior to the first crisis, peak during the
first crisis, dip in the interim, peak again during the second crisis, and decrease in the two
years following.
The independent variable measures in Case 1 began September 3, 1952, in the two
years prior to the first crisis. This case followed a shallow decline in the intensity of
Taiwanese diplomatic disruption. The level of disruption was highest in the two years leading
up to the first crisis. As a result of the high tensions across the Taiwan Strait in the aftermath
of the Chinese Civil War, ROC leader Chiang continued to use highly disruptive rhetoric up
until the first crisis. For example, once he learned that U.S. President Eisenhower sent the
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Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait due to the Korean War, Chiang declared that he believed
Nationalist forces could attack communists on the Mainland at any time without UN sanction
or fear of Soviet intervention. 488 In the following periods, Chiang was already exchanging
fire with the Mainland and did not need to threaten to use force. His diplomatic focus shifted
from threatening to use force against the communists to pressing the United States for a
mutual defense treaty, resulting in a shift from high to medium diplomatic disruption.

Figure 6.1: Case 2 Taiwanese Diplomatic Disruption

Case 2 measures began June 9, 1993 spanning the two years prior to the first 1990s
crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was the major component of
the independent variable for Case 2. The measure began at a low level and oscillated between
low and high, ending the cycle at a low level. Relations had begun to improve in the early
1990s when China established the ARATS and Taiwan launched the SEF. These two semigovernmental organizations opened negotiations, establishing a low level of disruption.
Meanwhile, top leadership in Taiwan pushed for a greater voice in the international arena,
488
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and later threatened independence, creating a high level of disruption. President Lee’s visit to
Cornell University in the United States was the action that aggravated the PRC and incited
their use of force. The cycle ended with hopes from both ROC and PRC leaders that the two
sides could return to the status quo ante.
Chinese diplomatic disruption is the second component of the independent variable.
Based on the PE Model, I expected this measure to create a bimodal curve. Figure 6.2 and
6.3 show the trends in the Chinese diplomatic disruption data for the two cases.

Figure 6.2: Case 1 Chinese Diplomatic Disruption

In Case 1, Chinese diplomatic disruption begins at a high level in the two years prior
to the first crisis, oscillates during the crises, and ends on a high level in the two years
following the second crisis. The high-level disruption leading up to the first crisis is a product
of tensions from the Chinese Civil War. During the two years prior and throughout the period
of study, PRC leadership called for the “liberation” of Taiwan and threatened to use force
against intervening states. However, once the PRC discovered that the United States was
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seriously considering using nuclear weapons in the region, it sought to negotiate with the
Unites States and Taiwan. Due to its alliance with the ROC and its aversion to communism,
the United States did not want to deepen ties with the PRC. As a result of this spurn, the
Communist propaganda espoused that the PRC had never been interested in only capturing
the Offshore Islands, but were determined instead to take the Offshore Islands and Taiwan at
the same time. Nothing came of this news due to the ceasefire.

Figure 6.3: Case 2 Chinese Diplomatic Disruption

Chinese diplomatic disruption in Case 2 appears to have a more bimodal structure. In
the two years prior to the first 1990s crisis, this measure increased from a low to a high level.
Disruption remained high during the first crisis, dipped to low levels in the brief interim, and
then reached high levels during the second crisis. While tensions initially deescalated in the
two years following the crises, the status quo would not be reinstituted until 2008 when
President Ma Ying-jeou (KMT) was elected. Levels started at a low intensity due to the SEFARATS talks. However, due to President Lee’s visit to Cornell University in the United
States, the SEF-ARATS talks were suspended and PRC leadership stated that they would
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only negotiate under the “one China” principle. In the interim between crises, Chinese
diplomatic disruption continued at high levels due to their threats of force against Taiwan.
The one instance of low diplomatic disruption during this period was the ARATS invitation
to the SEF to resume talks, yet tensions increased once more to high levels due to the refusal
of the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. The level of diplomatic disruption
during the second crisis was high, then decreased to low levels during the de-escalation of the
1999 Confrontation.
Taiwanese military disruption is the third component of the independent variable.
This measure was more important in Case 1 than in Case 2. According to the PE Model, I
expected another bimodal curve for this measure. This was loosely accurate in Case 1.

Figure 6.4: Case 1 Taiwanese Military Disruption

Taiwanese military disruption in Case 1 began at a high level in the aftermath of the
Chinese Civil War. It decreased to low levels at the end of the first crisis, was high again at
the start of the second crisis, and decreased to a medium level by the end of the second crisis.
In the two years prior to the first crisis, Chiang moved 58,000 troops to Quemoy and 15,000
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to Matsu.489 This movement of troops to mount an assault on the Mainland was a clear
indication of high level Taiwanese military disruption. Low-level disruption occurred in the
interim when Taiwan was not firing on the Mainland, but was stockpiling weapons. The level
of military disruption did not decrease significantly due to the militaristic leadership of
Chiang.
By contrast in Case 2, Taiwanese military disruption was rather insignificant. Due to
the fact that the ROC was no longer considered an independent state, they did not have the
capability nor desire to be highly militarized. They only maintained low-level arms deals
with the United States during this period, the purpose of which was to ensure Taiwan could
defend itself under attack. For example, while facing the PRC threat of high-tech weapons
and forces, the ROC Minister of National Defense expressed that the ROC armed forces
would draw up preventative strategies and expedite the building of a modern capability for
“early warning, rapid reaction, and joint operations.” 490 This amounted to a low level of
Taiwanese military disruption for the entire period.
Chinese military disruption is the fourth component of the independent variable.
According to the PE Model, I expected to see another bimodal curve in the data. Case 1 and 2
loosely follow this trend.
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Figure 6.5: Case 1 Chinese Military Disruption

As shown in figure 6.5, Chinese military disruption began at a high level during the
First Taiwan Strait Crisis. After Chiang Kai-shek ordered thousands of troops to Quemoy and
Matsu, the Chinese Communists began artillery bombardment of the islands. When the first
ceasefire was declared, disruption fell to a low level. In the time between the two crises, the
PRC—in response to U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons—signed a secret agreement with the
Soviet Union to develop nuclear capability. 491 During the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis
Chinese diplomatic disruption rose to a high level and fell to a low level again when the PRC
declared the second ceasefire. A brief confrontation between a U.S. ship in PRC waters and
the PLA resulted in a brief high level of disruption in the Taiwan Strait, but once the
ceasefire was reinstituted, tensions dropped down to low levels.
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Figure 6.6: Case 2 Chinese Military Disruption

Chinese military disruption in Case 2 more closely resembled a bimodal curve than in
Case 1. In the two years before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC staged military
exercises on Dongshan Island in Fujian Province resulting in a medium level of disruption.
During the crisis, China launched missiles into Taiwanese waters creating a high level of
disruption, while also conducting threatening joint military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In
the time between incidents, China has approximately 100 missiles aimed at Taiwan in
response to ROC consideration of joining the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system of the
United States. The level of military disruption peaked again during the 1999 Confrontation
when Chinese jet fighters pressed the centerline in the Taiwan Strait. Disruption fell to
medium levels when the PRC was only pointing missiles at Taiwan toward the end of the
confrontation. In the two years following the Taiwan Confrontation, military disruption fell
to low levels as the PRC stopped aiming missiles at Taiwan but continued to stockpile
weapons in the area.
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Conclusion
The independent variable is divided into four parts because each case began and
continued for different reasons. Some measures are more important than others. In Case 1,
both Chinese and Taiwanese military disruption were important measures, while in Case 2,
Taiwanese diplomatic disruption was most significant. Case 1 did not seem to follow my
predictions based on the PE Model due to the close chronological proximity to the Chinese
Civil War.

INTERVENING VARIABLE
The intervening variable of study is the level of negative feedback from the United
States in response to the disruptive actions of the PRC and ROC. According to the PE Model,
I expect to see varying degrees of response to Chinese and Taiwanese disruption. This will
depend on the relationship of the United States with each political entity in two very different
time periods.
U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan is the first element of the intervening variable.
In Case 1 the United States and the ROC on Taiwan are formal allies. The United States
considered the ROC to be the legitimate government of Greater China. This was in large part
due to the fear of Communism in the United States, and a result of political realities at the
conclusion of the Second World War. Due to their relationship as allies, U.S. diplomatic
opposition to Taiwan only reached medium levels. For example during the first crisis, the
United States was reluctant to sign a mutual defense treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. In the
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States tried to improve relations with the PRC in the
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Warsaw Talks, resulting in a medium level of opposition to Taiwan. This trend of improving
Sino-American relations would continue.
U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1990s had changed from the 1950s. The ROC was no
longer considered the legitimate government of China. U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan
in Case 2 was generally observed at medium levels as a result of the improvement of the
U.S.-PRC relationship through diplomacy and growing economic interdependency.
Additionally, the reluctance of the United States to support Taiwan, illustrated by President
Clinton’s “Three Nos Policy,” also shows medium level opposition.
The second element of the intervening variable is U.S. diplomatic opposition to
China. In Case 1, during the two years prior to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, U.S.
diplomatic opposition to Taiwan fluctuated between low and medium levels: low when the
United States publicly condemned China’s actions or supported Taiwan’s and medium when
the United States threatened to declare war against the Mainland and send forces in to
stabilize the region. Opposition to China peaked during the first crisis with the creation of the
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The high level opposition fell to medium
levels for the rest of the period due to U.S. threats to go to war against China.
In Case 2, the United States and China are much more economically interdependent,
which changes the type and magnitude of U.S. opposition. U.S. criticism of China’s
oppressive government and human rights record resulted in a low level of opposition.
Diplomatic opposition rose to medium levels due to U.S. arms deals with Taiwan and the
1979 Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. opposition to China increased to high levels when the U.S.
Congress agreed to issue Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit his alma mater, Cornell University in
the United States. This was against the wishes of the Clinton Administration.
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The third element of the intervening variable is U.S. military opposition to Taiwan. In
Case 1, the Nationalist Government on Taiwan was an ally of the United States against
communism. During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States ordered the Seventh
Fleet into the Taiwan resulting in a high level of military opposition. This measure was not
only designed to censure China, but also constrain Chiang Kai-shek. As a result of the nature
of the U.S.-ROC relationship, the United States did not militarily oppose any actions taken
by the Nationalists. In the 1990s this measure was similarly insignificant, but for separate
reasons.
The political landscape had changed in the period of détente between the first two
crises in the 1950s and the third crisis in the 1990s. Taiwan, officially considered by the
United States to be a province of China, was not subject to direct military opposition. The
PRC would consider any attack on Taiwan to be an attack on the “Motherland.” The United
States would not jeopardize its relationship with either of the two political entities in such a
way.
The fourth element of the intervening variable is U.S. military opposition to China. In
Case 1, U.S. military opposition to China was constantly at a high level due to the naval
forces, equipment, intelligence, and air support given to the ROC. U.S. military opposition to
China in Case 2 was high due to U.S. naval and air support, equipment, and intelligence
given to he ROC through arms deals.
The intervening variable of study is the negative feedback, or equilibrium forces
provided by the United States. Each of the four elements that create this variable measure is
important in the context of various events. For example, due to the amicable relationship with
the ROC on Taiwan, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan was the only logical option.
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Military opposition would have destroyed their relationship. The next section analyzes the
dependent variable.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The dependent variable of study is the resultant level of conflict in the region. I
hypothesized that if China or Taiwan were to increase their disruptive forces, then the United
States would increase its influence, resulting in a lower level of conflict. Conversely, if China
and Taiwan increased their disruptive actions, then the United States did not intervene, the
resultant level of conflict would still be high.
The first part of the dependent variable is the level of diplomatic conflict. From two
years to four years after Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, diplomatic conflict was at a level three.
The PRC would not directly communicate with the ROC and vise versa. However, the PRC
was willing to negotiate with the United States. In order to set a base line to compare the
status quo ante and the current level of conflict, I measured the dependent variable in the four
years to two years prior to the first crises in each case. The aftermath of the Second Taiwan
Strait Crisis was very similar to the status quo ante. In the years before the independent and
intervening variables, the PRC would not communicate or negotiate with the ROC on Taiwan
resulting in a level three.
From two years to four years after the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, the level of
diplomatic conflict was mostly observed at a level two, with a few level one incidents. For
instance, during the “Taiwanese Espionage Case,” the MAC complicated preexisting
communication networks, first by sending in spies in the first place, and second by being
uncooperative to negotiations with China. This element of the variable fell to low levels only
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when Taiwanese leaders espoused their desire to meet for talks. Diplomatic conflict was
observed at level one in the Taiwan Strait during the time before the Third Taiwan Strait
Crisis and 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. During this period Taiwan had just established SEF
and China created ARATS. These two semi-nongovernmental organizations helped get the
ball rolling towards unification and greater cooperation.
The level of military conflict is the second piece of the dependent variable. In the
aftermath of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, military conflict was at a level three. This was
largely due to the militarism of Chiang Kai-shek. For example in the spring of 1961, Chang
sought to fire nuclear tipped artillery shells from Jinmen. However, U.S. refusal to supply the
shells shut down this plan. In the years before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the level of
military conflict in the region was observed at a level two. PRC Premier Zhou En-lai
threatened to use force against the United States in Korea.
In the years following the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, military conflict in the region
was at a level three. The PRC was increasing its military deployment against Taiwan in 2002.
By November 30, 2003, the PRC had deployed 496 ballistic missiles within a radius of 600
kilometers.492 Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, military conflict was at a level two. The
ROC continued to sign arms deals with not only the United States, but also with other
countries in the international arena, such as France.
The third piece of the dependent variable is the level of third party involvement (TPI).
In Case 1 after the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the level of TPI escalated from level two to
level four. One example of a level four conflict was President Kennedy’s press conference in
which he said that the United States would defend Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands. Before
the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, TPI swung between level one and level three. Level one
492
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occurred when the United States extricated itself from the cross-Strait relationship in order
not to damage its relationship with China.
In Case 2 after the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation, TPI reached level three when the
Department of Defense submitted the Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC to the
U.S. Congress. 493 Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, President H. W. Bush decided to sell
150 jet fighters to Taiwan;494 as a result, TPI was observed at level four.
The dependent variable of study is the resultant level of conflict before and after the
crises in each case. The three parts that make up this variable measure are the level of
diplomatic conflict, the level of military conflict, and the level of third party involvement. In
Case 1, the level of diplomatic conflict was the same before and after at a level three.
Military conflict was observed at a level two before the conflict, and at a level three after.
Third party involvement before the First Taiwan Strait Crisis escalated from a level one to
three. After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, TPI increased from a level two to a level four.
In Case 2, the level of diplomatic conflict before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was
measured at a level one. The ROC and the PRC began to communicate with each other
through the creation of the SEF and ARATS. After the 1999 Confrontation, the level of
diplomatic conflict decreased from level two to level one. Before the Third Taiwan Strait
Crisis the level of military conflict was measured at level two, while in the aftermath of
second incident it was observed at level three. This was in part due to the provocative
rhetoric and actions of DPP President Chen. He helped to end the 1999 Taiwan
Confrontation, but increasingly expressed his pro-independence views. This provoked further
military exercises by the PLA. Before the first incident in the 1990s, TPI reached level four.
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According to the PE Model, I expected the levels of diplomatic and military conflict
to be the tails on either side of the two conflicts in each case. I expected the level of TPI to
react to the levels of diplomatic and military conflict within the confines of the existing
relationships and obligations to one another. Since the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises
occurred in the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, the levels of military and diplomatic
conflict before and after Case 1 were higher than in Case 2. The level of TPI in Case one
increased in reaction to the rising level of military and diplomatic conflict, but after the
crises, continued to increase. This was due to the dependence of Taiwan on the United States
and the militaristic leadership of Chian Kai-shek.

CONCLUSION
Why does the deadlock that has defined China-Taiwan relations for 65 years persist
despite periods of extreme tension and change? I use the Model of Punctuated Equilibrium
from evolutionary biology as a framework to answer this question. The PE Model is
comprised of two parts, positive and negative feedback. A positive feedback mechanism, or
punctuation, is a self-reinforcing process in which rapid change occurs as a result of
attention-shift and mimicking. A negative feedback cycle, or equilibrium, is a self-correcting
mechanism, which equalizes any outside force to create a stable output. According to this
model, if China and Taiwan increase their disruptive actions, then the United States will
increase its influence to promote stability, resulting in a lower level of conflict. Political
scientist, Weixing Hu discussed the PE Model in relation to the Taiwan Strait, but did not
execute a rigorous methodology that reflected the theory. This study illustrates how the
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Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium could be applied to the case of China and Taiwan in a
more methodical way than in Weixing Hu’s study.

METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
Originally a model of evolutionary biology, Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D.
Jones conceptualized the model of punctuated equilibrium in the context of political science.
Their model was broad enough to use as a framework into which other theories could fit. The
goal of their study was to examine the dramatic policy changes that “regularly occur in
American politics, even if most issues most of the time are characterized by more routine
developments.”495 The reason this model interested me in relation to the Taiwan Strait, was
that it offered a multifaceted framework to explain both long periods of stasis amid short
cycles of rapid disruption. Other theories that have been used to describe the political
deadlock across the Taiwan Strait, such as balance of power politics and complex
interdependence theory only explain part of the longitudinal phenomenon of political
stalemate. One large drawback of Baumgartner and Jones’ PE model was the lack of a
coherent methodological framework. Depending on the specific area of research, the
measures and methodological approach changed. Their anthology of works included
statistical studies of American policy change. I sought to apply this model to international
relations in the form of case study research.
Political scientist Weixing Hu attempted to use the PE Model to explain cycles of
change and stability across the Taiwan Strait. He defined the negative feedback cycle as the
“growing economic interdependence, domestic constraints in Taiwan, economic development
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and peaceful unification strategy of Beijing, and Washington’s concerns about peace and
stability in East Asia and its leverage over Taipei and Beijing.”496 The elements of positive
feedback included in his study are: the role of issue cycles and impulsive drivers for
change.497 Weixing Hu sections off the history of the Taiwan Strait into three broad time
periods which each included a period of change and détente. His three case studies do not
follow a set format, but are short summaries of only the events that support his claims.
In this study I endeavored to correct the loose method of Weixing Hu and establish a
systematic approach for applying the PE Model to case study research. I illustrated how the
PE Model could be used to develop a codebook to examine historical cases. My process is
highly replicable, unlike that of Weixing Hu. If another scholar were to repeat my study, they
would find similar results. I believe future studies that implement the PE Model should be
similarly systematized. In the process of combing through historical documents and coding
specific events, this method safeguards against cherry-picking history to support a
hypothesis.
I hypothesized that if the level of positive feedback generated between China and
Taiwan increased, then the level of negative feedback from the United States would increase,
resulting in a lower level of conflict. I operationalized the independent variable as Chinese
and Taiwanese military and diplomatic disruption on three-point nominal scales. The
intervening variable was also made up of four parts: U.S. diplomatic and military opposition
to both China and Taiwan. I operationalized the dependent variable as the level of military
conflict, the level of diplomatic conflict, and the level of third party involvement, each on a
four-point nominal scale.
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I implemented two theory-guided case studies. My first case encompassed the
positive feedback cycle formed by the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises. The second
case discussed the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1999 Taiwan Strait Confrontation. I
measured the independent and intervening variables over five time periods in each case: in
the two years before the first crisis, during the first crisis, the time in between, during the
second crisis, and in the two years following the second crisis. I measured the dependent
variable within the two years before and in the two years following the independent and
intervening variable measures.

FINDINGS
Through this research, I found evidence to support my hypothesis according to the PE
Model. As the level of disruption from both China and Taiwan increased, the United States
increased their opposing influence and/or forces in order to achieve a lower level of conflict
than during the crisis situations. The variable measures for both cases were different due to
changing circumstances and relationships. China became a superpower and Taiwan
democratized in the span of time between my two cases.
As the level of disruption increased, the level of U.S. involvement increased. As was
discussed in the Analysis section of this chapter, Case 1 encompassed the First (1954-55) and
the Second (1958) Taiwan Strait Crises and Case 2 included the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
(1995-96) and the 1999 Taiwan Confrontation. In Case 1, Chinese and Taiwanese military
disruption were the most important components of the independent variable while in Case 2,
the diplomatic disruption of Taiwan and the military disruption of China were the most
important factors. In Case 1, U.S. military opposition to China was the most important
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element of the intervening variable, while in Case 2, U.S. diplomatic opposition to Taiwan
was most significant. Despite these differences, I found evidence to support my hypothesis:
as Taiwanese and Chinese disruption to the system increased, so did U.S. opposition to this
disruption.
The point of deviation for my hypothesis has to do with the dependent variable: the
resultant level of conflict. I will discuss the particulars of this limitation later in this chapter.
The resultant level of conflict in both cases did not match the level of conflict before the two
instances of positive feedback. This had to do with the way my methodology was written.
Despite this setback, my study is still significant. In establishing a more systematized
methodology for the application of the PE Model, I unintentionally limited the scope of
possible observations. My framework is limiting, but no one has attempted to do this before.

LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations to my study that I must acknowledge and discuss. Many
of these limitations are inherent in case study research. Some of the components of my
independent and intervening variables have many data points, while others only have a few.
However, the written records available to me restricted my research.
A second limitation of my study was the oversimplification of the United States as the
only actor invested in the negative feedback cycle of incremental policy change. In reality,
every actor in the system acted in some instances as a balancer and as a destabilizer. For
instance, in Case 2, the actions and rhetoric of Presidents Lee and Chen were destabilizing,
while the line of negotiation between ARATS and SEF was a force of stability.
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Another inherent drawback of case study research is the inability to control for
historical events external to the study. I was not able to control for the increased tensions that
occurred due to the Chinese Civil War or the additional pressures of the Cold War in Case 1.
I did, however, repeatedly acknowledge these events as influential to my findings.
A fourth limitation of my study was the chosen bounds of my variables. History and
conflicts in particular are not guided by averages. Each is unique in the time it takes a crisis
to erupt and dissipate. Instead of using dates to define when I measure my variables, it would
have been more beneficial to use events common to both cases to define the time periods of
each of my variables. For instance, the dependent variable of the level of conflict in Case 2
was still rising in the specified time frame due to the provocative leadership of DPP President
Chen. Not until pro-status quo President Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008, was a period of
détente reestablished in cross-Strait relations.
Despite these limitations, such a systematized application of the PE Model has not
been tried before in case study research. These limitations could be improved upon in future
research.

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Future researchers who use the PE Model in case study research should strive to
implement a systematized approach. Designing a codebook using nominal scales, defining
timeframes of variables based on common events, and implementing a precise lateral
comparison of the cases are lessons future scholars might glean from this work.
In the process of conducting research I discovered several avenues of thought which
could be interesting to further research, but which did not fit into the scope of this study.
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First, the role of public opinion in Taiwan and domestic divisions, which influenced
Taiwan’s foreign policy would be an interesting area of study. There exist divisions between
Taiwan natives and Chinese immigrants to the island that found expression in political
parties in the 1990s. These divisions become especially important in election years.
Another possible area of research is the applicability of the PE Model to the growing
economic interdependence of Taiwan and China. Economic measures are slower acting than
diplomatic or military actions that can seem rash and fast. Baumgartner and Jones combined
the concepts of negative feedback and deep structure in the PE Model. Connie Gersick on the
other hand tries to separate these concepts while comparing the PE Model across several
different disciplines.
The issue of deep structure is an interesting one. Gersick defines deep structure as, “a
network of fundamental, interdependent ‘choices,’ of the basic configuration into which a
system’s units are organized, and the activities that maintain both this configuration and the
system’s resource exchange with the environment. Deep structure in human systems is
largely implicit.”498 I had an idea that deep structure in relation to the Taiwan Strait or more
broadly to international relations could be related to identity politics and the study of
nationalism and national identity. That state is also defined by the relationships it chooses to
enter into and how it maintains them. These identities and relationships change only
incrementally over time due to multiple layers of constructed limitations. When these
definitions do change, it is a rapid process largely due to attention shift and mimicking.
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CONCLUSION
This study illustrates how the model of punctuated equilibrium can be used in case
study research. The Taiwan Strait deadlock can be explained using this model. As the level
of Chinese and Taiwanese disruption to the system increases, the level of U.S. opposition to
this disruption increases, to eventually reinstitute stability. In recent news, voters in Taiwan
elected Tsai Ing-wen, their first woman president and Democratic Progressive Party member.
Her leadership of the independence-minded DPP and her refusal to accept the “One China
principle” will make it difficult for Tsai to manage Taipei’s relationship with Beijing.499 She
has made it clear that she wants to preserve the cross-Strait status quo and is unlikely to
reverse the policies of the Ma Administration. Following Tsai’s election, Xinhua News
released a commentary in which it warned that “if the DPP and Tsai promote ‘peaceful
Taiwan independence’ or ‘de jure Taiwan independence,’ they will become ‘troublemakers’
in cross-Strait relations, jeopardizing Taiwan’s stability and development.”500 Xinhua went on
to warn the Tsai Administration to learn from the mistakes of Chen Shui-bian, the last DPP
president who stirred up trouble across the Taiwan Strait. Will these new developments lead
to greater stability or further disruption? Who knows, but the deadlock continues nonetheless.
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